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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1. Problem statement  
 
The South African Constitution establishes local government as an autonomous sphere 
of government and vests both executive and legislative authority in municipal councils.1 
Carefully defined powers are provided for local government to govern its internal affairs 
without interference from provincial and national spheres of government2 The 
Constitution also requires the other spheres of government to respect its autonomy and 
not to encroach into its competences.3  
 
As an exception to local autonomy, a supervisory power is conferred on provincial and 
national spheres of government. This power is meant to ensure that municipalities act 
within their mandates and means and that they effectively deliver basic services to the 
communities. The supervisory power of the senior spheres of government includes 
regulating the activities of local government, monitoring that each municipality acts 
within its mandates and means, supporting whenever it requires support and intervening 
into local government when a municipality malfunctions.4  
 
Intervention into a malfunctioning municipality by senior levels of government is thus 
one of the instruments of supervision that the senior spheres use to check illegalities 
and underperformances by a municipality. Accordingly, where a municipality errs in 
performing its executive obligations, section 139(1) of the Constitution is triggered which 
                                                          
1
  S151(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 1996 Constitution). 
2
  S151(2) of the 1996 Constitution.  
3
  S151(3) and (4) of the 1996 Constitution. 
4
  S139(1) of the 1996 Constitution.  
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requires provincial governments to intervene without the consent of the malfunctioning 
municipality.5 Section 139(1) is thus a means for provincial governments to take 
corrective action to remedy certain failure/s by local governments in performing its 
executive obligations.6  
 
Accordingly, a total of 70 municipalities were subjected to section 139 interventions from 
1998 to 2014, which include interventions in terms of section 139(1) where executive 
obligations were not fulfilled.7 However, the interventions were not done in a consistent 
manner and in accordance with constitutional and legal prescription. As per the 
Department of Cooperative Governance (hereinafter CoGTA), there are serious 
shortcomings in the application of section 139(1) interventions. These shortcomings 
relate mainly to the inconsistent and incorrect interpretation of the law regulating 
intervention. This led to several undue provincial interventions, compromising the 
autonomy of the municipalities which are intervened by the provinces. For example, 
provincial governments often fail to implement targeted monitoring and support systems 
to detect early warning signals before invoking an intervention.8 Instead of being 
curative in nature interventions result in temporary take-overs.9 In addition, during 2013 
one of the key findings of the National Management Forum workshop confirmed that 
there were various uncertainties with regards to the implementation of section 139.10 
                                                          
5
  S139 (1)-(5) of the 1996 Constitution. 
6
  S139(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
7
  Department of Cooperative Governance Joint Workshop with the National and Provincial Legislatures 
“Application of section 139 of the Constitution, and the need for legislation to regulate its implementation” 2 
November 2010 (2010) 7-8. (hereinafter Joint workshop with Legislatures). 
8
  CoGTA Joint workshop with Legislatures (2010) 19 -21. 
9
  CoGTA Joint workshop with Legislatures (2010) 11-12. . 
10
  Department of Cooperative Governance 5
th
 National Managers Forum Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support 
and Interventions Bill 30 April 2013(2013) 10 -11(hereinafter Managers Forum).  
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The danger here is that the intervention power in terms of section 139(1) may be 
abused by provincial governments.11 
 
The good news is that the Constitution itself anticipates that provincial power of 
intervention may be abused.12 Hence, it establishes a mechanism for intergovernmental 
checks to safeguard municipal autonomy against undue provincial intervention. This 
safeguard is the power of the Minister responsible for local government, at present the 
portfolio falls within the mandate of the Minister for CoGTA and the National Council of 
Provinces (hereinafter NCOP) to veto and terminate provincial intervention in terms of 
section 139(2)(b)and 139(3)(b) of the Constitution. Thus, the Minister or the NCOP may 
terminate those interventions in instances where either of them finds the intervention 
powers to be inappropriately used by a provincial government. Therefore the veto power 
is aimed at preventing undue interference into the autonomy of local governments, and 
ensures the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations are 
adhered to.13  
 
Despite significance in the constitutional objective of the Minister‟s and the NCOP‟s veto 
power up till now it is still not known whether and how often this power is exercised by 
the two institutions.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
  CoGTA Managers Forum (2013) 10 -12. 
12
  S139(2) and (3) of the 1996 Constitution.  
13
  S41 (h)(i)-((vi) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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1.2. Significance of the study 
 
The study aims to detect the outcomes for provincial and local governments when the 
veto power was invoked. This in turn provides evidence based information on the extent 
to which the intergovernmental checks and balances are working in practice. This is 
significant as the study measures the degree to which the veto power acts as a 
safeguard in protecting the autonomy and institutional integrity of local governments. 
While the data to be collated and presented will document the role and function 
currently performed by the Minister and NCOP it will also provide an opportunity to 
assess the legal framework. 
 
1.3.  Research question 
The main question that this study seeks to find answers to is whether and how the 
Minister and NCOP exercise their veto power to terminate interventions in terms of 
section 139(2)(b) and 139(3)(b) of the Constitution. With a view to answering this 
question other related questions will be raised and answered including: What is the 
constitutional and legal framework for exercising the veto power? How often is the veto 
power invoked? What procedure is followed by the Minister and NCOP when exercising 
the veto power in terms of section 139(2)(b) and 139(3)(b) of the Constitution? How 
consistent are the Minister and NCOP in terms of exercising this power? What were the 
outcomes in the instances where the veto powers were exercised by the Minister and 
the NCOP?   
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1.4.  Argument  
The main argument of this paper is that provincial intervention powers as per section 
139 were borne in the context of attaining the local government developmental 
mandate. Contrary to this purpose there is much abuse of provincial governments into 
the affairs of local government which warrant serious intergovernmental checks. These 
intergovernmental checks is to be championed by the Minister and NCOP by way of 
section 139(2)(b) and 139(3)(b) veto power. Notwithstanding the sound constitutional 
safeguards its efficacy lies in its implementation in practise. The argument is that the 
Minister and the NCOP have failed so far to fulfil their role as conceived by the 
Constitution.  
 
1.5.  Literature survey 
There are several works dealing with section 139 interventions. Yet none of these works 
is based on empirical studies.  
 
De Visser and Steytler have written extensively on the legal requirements and 
procedures to be followed when invoking section 139 interventions.14 The two authors 
also emphasise the supervisory and control role that the Minister and NCOP should 
play in protecting the integrity of affected municipalities, documented in their study 
conducted in 2004 which assessed the need for ‘Establishing a regulatory framework for 
provincial interventions in terms of section 139 of the Constitution’.15 They also argue for 
                                                          
14
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012): 15 – 18(2) –(4). 
15
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012): 15 – 24 & 25.  
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extending the veto powers to all types of interventions.16 De Visser and Steytler critises 
the legal status and role of the veto power as no legal sanctions are associated with 
non-compliance of its provisions as per sections 139(2)(a) and 139(3)(a) of the 
Constitution.17However, the study undertaken by the authors does not focus on the 
actual implementation of the veto power by the Minister and NCOP. The present study, 
thus builds on theoretical concerns iterated for the functioning of the veto power by 
analysing empirical information for the veto power. 
 
Murrary, Bezruki & Ferrel „et al' conducted an analysis on the functioning of the NCOP‟s 
general oversight role including its role in terms of section 139 in Speeding 
Transformation: Monitoring and Oversight in the NCOP. The analysis depicted the 
difficulties and the institutional growth of the NCOP.18 Moreover, in 2007 Murray and 
Hoffman conducted an analysis specific to the review function of the NCOP which found 
the NCOP to perform well during the formative years of section 139(1).19The analysis 
was substantially based on data collected during the Speeding Transformation: 
Monitoring and Oversight in the NCOP study. The analysis on the review function by 
Murray and Hoffman related to instances when the NCOP approved section 139 
interventions. Murray and Hoffman reported that in all but rare cases were the NCOP 
advised to invoke the veto power thus emphasising the need for this study.20 While the 
                                                          
16
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012): 15 – 25 & 26. 
17
  Steytler N ‘Establishing a regulatory framework for provincial interventions in terms of section 139 of the 
Constitution’(2004) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed 6 June 2013) 12.  
18
  Murray, Bezruki & Ferrel et al Interim Report- Speeding Transformation: Monitoring and Oversight in the NCOP 
in Report to the NCOP (July 2004) 7 – 16.    
19
  Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer Y ‘The National Council of Provinces and Provincial Intervention in Local 
Government’ (2007) STELL LR 24 – 26.  
20
  Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer Y (2007) 24 – 26. 
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study by Murray and Hoffman is useful in determining the methodology it falls short in 
two respects: first, since it only focuses on the NCOP and second, since its focuses on 
the review function rather than the veto power.  
 
Mettler documents in his study on Provincial-municipal relations: A few challenges that 
despite the constitutional design promoting co-operative governance arrangements in 
practice centralisation still reign. This is a significant point because it would mean that 
the Minister and NCOP when exercising the veto power must refrain from partisan 
politics. 21 This is particularly so in instances where key decision-making is required that 
would have serious political consequences.22 Malherbe supported this assertion and 
argues that the powers of national government in provincial affairs and provinces in 
local government affairs are increasingly being utilised for the purpose of 
centralisation.23 In amplification, the trends thus far for section 139(1) interventions in 
instances do not confirm improved intergovernmental arrangements. 
 
1.6.  Chapter Outline  
This paper is divided into five chapters including this introductory chapter.  Chapter two 
deals with the legal framework for section 139(1)(b)(c) interventions that deal with 
executive obligations where the veto power of the Minister and NCOP applies.  The veto 
power conferred to the Minister and NCOP in section 139(2) and (3) will be discussed 
and the legal framework for the study will be outlined.  
                                                          
21
  Mettler J ‘Provincial-municipal relations: A few challenges’ (2001) Law Democracy and Development 224. 
22
  Mettler J (2001) 224. 
23
  Malherbe R ‘The Constitutional Distribution of powers’ in De Villiers (ed) Review of provinces and local 
government in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice (2008)27 - 28.   
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  Chapter three presents the data which relate to the veto powers invoked by the 
Minister and the NCOP for the last five years. Such data relate to the reasons, legal 
basis and the methods used by the Minister and NCOP in exercising the veto power in 
terms of section 139 (2) (b) and 139(3)(b) of the Constitution. 
 
Chapter four will analyse the data presented in chapter three. From the analyses the 
key findings will follow outlining the processes, skills and capacity available to both the 
Minister and NCOP.  
 
Chapter five will provide an evaluative summary of the efficacy of the institutions and 
extract the best practices where possible to inform further policy and/or legislative 
development. It will also seek to make recommendations on how to strengthen the veto 
power conferred to the Minister and NCOP.  
 
1.7. Methodology 
The study is informed by desk top research which focuses on analysing primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources relate to the collection and perusal of data 
from policy documents, legislation and official documents. The Minister and NCOP will 
be requested to furnish the relevant information relating to interventions terminated in 
terms of section 139(2)(b) and 139(3) (c) over the last five years (2010 to 2014). The 
secondary sources rely on the work of authors and other literature which focus on the 
application of section 139 interventions. 
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Chapter 2: Legal Framework for exercising the veto power conferred to the 
Minister and NCOP  
 
2.1      Introduction  
The veto power in terms of sections 139(2) and 139(3) can only be exercised once a 
section 139 intervention is invoked.24 However, the veto power only applies to section 
139(1) intervention. The criteria to evaluate the veto power thus requires an evaluation 
of the legal and policy framework pertaining to section 139(1) interventions as it will 
inform the pre-determining factors to be taken into account for interventions. As it sets 
out,  (i) when an intervention is justified; (ii) what measures must be taken by the 
Minister and NCOP upon receipt of the notice of intervention, and (iii) a framework for 
appropriate application of the veto power.  
 
Moreover, section 139(1) creates distinguishable parameters in which the veto power 
must be exercised. This is critical in ensuring a balanced approach to uphold the 
autonomy of both local and provincial government. Section 41 of the Constitution 
requires all government spheres to respect the constitutional status powers and 
functions conferred to each other and not to encroach on the integrity of another sphere. 
This relates to the geographical, functional and/ or institutional integrity of each sphere 
that should co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by fostering 
sound relationships with each other and coordinating actions between each other.25 
Sections 139(1) and 41 of the Constitution thus demand constant interplay, on the one 
                                                          
24
  S 139 (1); 139(2) and 139(3) of the 1996 Constitution. 
25
  S41(1)(iv) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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hand, between justifiably encroaching on responsibilities and powers from one sphere 
to another, and entrusting the responsibilities and powers conferred to that sphere by 
the Constitution, on the other. 
 
The veto power is rooted in the reconfiguration of local government as an autonomous 
sphere of government.26 The latter entrenched through representative democracy that 
affords the local community the right to elect their representatives in local councils.27 
The decentralisation of local government powers are further entrenched in the 
Constitution since it is empowered to govern its own affairs without undue interference 
from either national and/ or provincial governments.28  
 
Section 139(1) creates a limitation to this autonomy in the interest of promoting and 
protecting service delivery obligations. Upon invocation of section 139(1) interventions, 
the veto power i.e. the Minister and NCOP then checks for compliance with the co-
operative governance principles. Thus, the veto power entails a complex arrangement 
of many constitutional principles that come into play. 
 
This chapter outlines the policy and legal framework for section 139(1) interventions as 
it relates to the veto power and establish the criteria to assess the application of the 
veto power. In addition, it discusses the process for the exercise of the veto power.   
 
                                                          
26
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012): 1 -23.  
27
  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 115.                                                                                                                                                                        
28
  Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development White Paper on Local Government (1998):38-46. 
(hereinafter the WPLG). 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
2.2 Legal and policy framework for section 139(1) interventions 
The Constitution provides a broad overview of the imperatives for provincial intervention 
powers. To appreciate the importance of section 139(1) interventions, relevant 
provisions as provided for in the Constitution are quoted below, namely: 
 
„Provincial intervention in local government: 
(1)When a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the 
Constitution or legislation, the relevant provincial executive may intervene by taking any 
appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation, including- 
(a) issuing a directive to the Municipal Council, describing the extent of the failure to fulfil its 
obligations and stating any steps required to meet its obligations; 
(b) assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that municipality to the extent 
necessary to- 
(i)  maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards for 
the rendering of a service; 
(ii) prevent that Municipal Council from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial 
to the interests of another municipality or to the province as a whole; or 
(iii) maintain economic unity; or 
(c) dissolving the Municipal Council and appointing an administrator until a newly elected 
Municipal Council has been declared elected, if exceptional circumstances warrant such 
a step‟.
29  
 
The above-mentioned provisions explicitly state that interventions ought to provide a 
safeguard to protect and promote minimum standards of local government service 
delivery. Further, it must serve as a mechanism to maintain or re-establish democracy 
                                                          
29
  S139 of the 1996 Constitution.  
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to ensure that local government fulfils its constitutional mandate.30 Keeping this is mind, 
it implies that in some instances provincial governments must restore a municipality to 
financial health or ensure financial sustainability for a municipality.31 In other instances it 
might imply that any signs of a dysfunctional local government must be addressed as a 
matter of urgency in order to promote accountability and to restore public faith in local 
government institutions.32 The latter include actions directed at exposing and preventing 
corruption and maladministration at a municipality.33 
 
Section 139 differentiates between three types of provincial interventions. First, section 
139(1) applies to a failure to fulfil executive obligation/s, as discussed above. Secondly, 
section 139(4) applies to failure to approve a budget or any revenue raising mechanism 
as required by legislation and in this intervention process a council must be dissolved. 
Thirdly, section 139(5) exclusively deals with a crisis in the financial affairs of a 
municipality that may result in a failure to deliver services and/ or meet other 
constitutional obligations.34 A further distinction is that the veto power only applies to 
section 139(1) interventions rather than those invoked by 139(4) or (5) of the 
Constitution. In fact, with respect to these interventions the Constitution cautions that if 
a provincial executive cannot or does not adequately exercise the powers or perform 
the functions in section 139(4) and (5), the national executive ‘must intervene in the 
stead of the relevant provincial executive’ thus imposing a positive obligation to 
                                                          
30
  S139(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
31
  S139(5) of the 1996 Constitution. 
32
  Ss 152 and 153 of the 1996 Constitution. 
33
  WPLG (1998):43. 
34
  S139 of the 1996 Constitution. 
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intervene. In stark contrast to these interventions many restrictions are placed on 139(1) 
intervention.  
 
Despite noticeable differentiation by the Constitution emerging jurisprudence 
entrenches a uniform approach of restraint to interventions.35 For instance, in the 
Premier of the Western Cape v Overberg District Municipality case the Supreme Court 
of Appeal dealt with an intervention brought in terms of section 139(4). The Court had to 
decide whether the province was justified in dissolving the municipal council because it 
failed to adopt an annual budget by the prescribed timeframes. Nonetheless, the Court 
emphatically argued that despite the provision seemingly making it obligatory for 
provincial executives to dissolve the municipal council in these circumstances, it should 
not proceed without circumspection. Firstly, the Court discussed at length the process of 
„appropriate steps‟ to be followed during the intervention process. Furthermore, the 
Court instructed that what is deemed appropriate must be informed by the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case.36 Moreover, the Court held that all actions must 
be based on the principles of legality.37 Accordingly the court reinstated the councillors 
effectively overturning the intervention.   
 
Bearing the above in mind, it becomes evident that the autonomy of municipalities is to 
be protected notwithstanding the type of intervention being invoked. Further to this, the 
courts have entrenched a culture of respect for municipal autonomy. Therefore, the 
                                                          
35
  The Premier of the Western Cape v Overberg District Municipality (801/2010) [2011] ZASCA 23 (18 March 2011)  
(hereinafter Overberg Case) and Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and 
Others (231/2009) [2009] ZAECBHC (hereinafter Mnquma Case). 
36
  See Overberg Case at para 19 and Mnquma Case at paras 47 and 38.   
37
. See Overberg and Mnquma Case. 
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Constitutional Court eloquently states the most appropriate approach to be adhered to 
regarding provincial interventions In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa:  
 
„What the NT [national text] seeks hereby to realise is a structure for [Local Government] LG 
that, on the one hand, reveals a concern for the autonomy and integrity of LG and prescribes 
a hands-off relationship between LG and other levels of government and, on the other, 
acknowledges the requirement that higher levels of government monitor LG functioning and 
intervene where such functioning is deficient or defective in a manner that compromises this 
autonomy. This is the necessary hands-on component of the relationship‟.
38
  
 
Based on the above, when an intervention is invoked a balance must be struck between 
respecting the municipality‟s autonomy as far as possible while ensuring effective 
government at local level.39 In striking this balance a so-called blanket or „one size fits 
all‟ approach is inappropriate and a determination must be conducted on a case by case 
basis since each case is unique in nature.40 Likewise, all cases of intervention must be 
governed by normative standards.41  
 
The questions that arise are what constitutes a „failure‟, and what constitutes „executive 
obligation‟. Moreover, when a council is dissolved in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the 
Constitution „exceptional circumstances’ must be present to warrant the dissolution of 
                                                          
38
  In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996–1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 373. 
39
  Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer Y ‘(2007) 7-8. 
40
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012) 15: 19 - 23. 
41
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012) 15: 19 - 23. 
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the council.42 The Constitution offers provincial executives the discretion to intervene by 
taking „appropriate steps’ when such exceptional circumstances exist.43 This begs the 
question what are the exceptional circumstances that are envisaged in the Constitution? 
What does „appropriate steps‟ imply? Furthermore, what is the distinction between the 
executive and legislative obligations of a municipal council since a council exercises 
both these functions?44  
 
Prior to the Mnquma Local Municipality and Another v Premier of the Eastern Cape and 
Others judgment a normative framework for section 139(1) intervention was lacking. 
This resulted in much uncertainty and inconsistency in its application. Limitations on the 
wording of section 139(1) in regard to failure to fulfil an executive obligation, had led to 
many difficulties in terms of interpretation.45 However, the Mnquma judgement created 
much needed clarity with regards to the practical application of the law. 
 
In Mnquma the Court defined the term executive to connote an execution of something 
such as, having the function of executing, especially as concerned with carrying out the 
laws or decree.46 Therefore, once a municipal council fails to perform its executive 
obligation, the first substantive ground for an intervention is triggered. In determining 
what constitutes a „failure’ as mentioned above it does not relate to past failures, or 
                                                          
42
  S159(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
43
  S139(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
44
  S151(2) of the 1996 Constitution.  
45
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012) 15: 19 - 23. 
46
  Mnquma Case paras 62 - 63. 
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perceived failures.47 The test to be applied is to measure the omission against the 
established norms and standards as set out in the legislative framework. For this 
reason, the Minister and NCOP must measure the failure of the executive function 
against these normative standards and determine whether the provincial executive 
acted appropriately or inappropriately for that matter by invoking the intervention in 
terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution.48  
 
The term „exceptional circumstances’ is not defined in the Constitution; however, in 
Mnquma the Court considered the nature and meaning of this.49 The Court pronounced 
that what constitutes „exceptional circumstances’ depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case.50 It stressed that section 139(1)(c) is a measure of last resort 
in instances where an executive obligation cannot be fulfilled but for the dissolution of 
council.51 It would therefore be necessarily assumed that milder forms of intervention 
must be considered prior to invoking this drastic step.52 Despite this, it should be 
stressed that the legal standard to determine the appropriateness of this step is not 
reliant on the execution of prior forms of interventions.53 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
  City of Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape and Others (95933/08)[2008] ZAWCHC 52; 2008 (6) SA 345     
(C) para 79.   
48
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012): 18 - 19. 
49
  Mnquma Case at paras 74 - 79.  
50
  Mnquma Case at para 77. 
51
  Mnquma Case at para 78.  
52
  Mnquma Case at para 68. 
53
  Mnquma Case at para 69. 
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2.3 Assessment criteria for section 139(1) intervention   
In Mnquma the Court held that what is appropriate must suit the situation, by taking into 
consideration the nature of the executive obligation that was not fulfilled, the interests of 
those affected and the interest of the affected municipality‟.54  Within this context it 
should be mentioned that recourse to court action - even though discouraged by the co-
operative governance principles - may be an appropriate step if it would ensure the 
fulfilment of the executive obligation in the least intrusive manner.55 In addition, the 
Court unequivocally stated that the steps articulated in section 139(1)(a); (b), and (c) 
are not successive steps, and should thus not be interpreted and/ or applied as such.56  
 
As a consequence, issuing a directive per section 139(1)(a) was no longer viewed as a 
compulsory requirement. Previously a directive was issued by the provincial executive 
to the malfunctioning municipality to place it on terms and to request that an executive 
function be fulfilled or the threat of a more invasive intervention step is followed. 
However, the Second Amendment Act changed the wording in the text of section 139 of 
the Constitution, which resulted in a watering down of the legal status of the directive.57 
Mnquma interpreted the amended text and confirmed that a directive was no longer a 
binding requirement. In 2011, CoGTA introduced draft legislation to regulate section 139 
and 100 interventions.58 A list of preconditions was compiled that constitutes 
„appropriate steps’ in the draft legislation. This list largely codifies the findings of the 
                                                          
54
  Mnquma Case at paras 70 -72. 
55
  Mnquma Case  at paras 70-72.  
56
  Mnquma Case at para 69. 
57
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 3 of 2003.  
58
  Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Draft Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support 
and Interventions (Bill 31 May 2013) [B-12] . 
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Mnquma judgement.59 However, during 2014 in Mogalakwena Local Municipality v 
Provincial Executive Council Limpopo and Others, the Gauteng High Court Division 
reached a different interpretation.60Mogalakwena distinguished itself from Mnquma 
since it dealt with a section 139(1)(b) intervention. The Court stated that: 
 
„…If the Legislature had intended to withdraw the safeguard previously expressed to exist by the 
Constitutional Court in relation to the requirement than an intervention under subsection 1(b) be 
preceded by a directive, it would have said so in clear and direct language and not contend itself 
with the excision of the conjunction “and” and the enactment of section 139(2)(b).‟61  
 
The Court reached this conclusion by referring to Supreme Court of Appeal judgements 
dealing with the interpretation of documents.62 Additionally, it viewed the amendment of 
139(1) to require greater emphasis on the separation of powers between the three 
spheres of government.63 From the above-mentioned discussion the following 
deductions can be drawn, namely:   
 
 If it is objectively established that grounds for intervention exists, the first leg of 
the enquiry is triggered;  
 The Minister and NCOP will then move to the second leg of the enquiry, which is 
to determine whether the action undertaken by the provincial executive is 
appropriate, and;  
                                                          
59
  See IMSI Bill. 
60
  Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and Others [2014] JOL 32103 (GP) 
paras 18 – 20 (hereinafter Mogalakwena Case). 
61
  Mogalakwena Case at para 20. 
62
  Mogalakwena Case at para 19. 
63
  Mogalakwena Case at para 21. 
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 What is „appropriate’ entails an assessment to measure the action taken against 
the benchmarks as set out in the Constitution and the Guidelines on the 
application of section 100 and 139 interventions.In addition, the Minister and 
NCOP will take into consideration whether the preconditions together with the 
appropriate steps invoked by the provincial executive justify the continued 
intervention in a municipality measured against the standards as set out in case 
law. 
 
2.4 Legal process for exercising the veto power 
Section 139(2) states „if a provincial executive intervenes in a municipality in terms of 
section 139(1)(b) it must submit a written notice of the intervention to both the Minister, 
the NCOP and provincial legislature within 14 days after the intervention began’.64 It 
prescribes further that the intervention must end if the Minister disapproves of the 
intervention within 28 days after the intervention began or by the end of that period has 
not approved the intervention. Thus, the intervention requires a so-called positive 
approval. Therefore, no legal obligation is placed on the Minister to articulate the basis 
for the veto. More critically, no communication is required from the Minister to the 
provincial executive or affected municipality. The Constitution may purposefully be 
vague to accommodate broad discretion for the Minister when exercising the veto 
power. However, to date the veto power has not received the necessary focus and 
remains an area that CoGTA is yet to address adequately.65  
 
                                                          
64
  S139(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
65
  Draft Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Interventions (Bill 31 May 2013) [B-12]. 
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Since the veto power is not addressed explicitly in the draft legislation; its application 
remains a contested area of interpretation. For example, if the Minister approves an 
intervention, the NCOP may still disapprove thereof within 180 days after the 
intervention was initiated or by the end of that period has not approved the intervention. 
Again, it should be noted that the intervention requires so-called positive approval. The 
NCOP should reach a decision independently from the Minister. It cannot overturn the 
decision of the Minister in a sense that the NCOP cannot approve the continuation of an 
intervention that the Minister has vetoed. The NCOP can only veto interventions that the 
Minister has approved. Emphasis is placed on narrowing down interventions rather than 
supporting an increase thereof.   
 
Section 139(3) provides for instances when a Council is dissolved in terms of section 
139(1)(c). It states that the provincial executive must immediately submit a written 
notice of the dissolution to the Minister, the NCOP and applicable provincial legislature. 
The dissolution takes effect 14 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the NCOP 
unless set aside by the Minister or the NCOP before the expiry of those 14 days. In 
practice the provincial legislature seems absent in the oversight role that it could fulfil.66 
The short timeframes could seriously undermine the veto power and the NCOP and 
Minister may not be in a position to make an informed decision. There seems to be no 
consistent practise where the provincial legislature submits its views to the Minister or 
the NCOP.67 The provincial parliament must regularly exercise oversight over the 
                                                          
66
  Department of Cooperative Governance Joint Workshop with the National and Provincial Legislatures 
“Application of section 139 of the Constitution, and the need for legislation to regulate its implementation” 2 
November 2010 (2010) 12. (hereinafter Joint Workshop with Legislatures (2010)).  
67
  CoGTA Joint Workshop with Legislatures (2010): 12. 
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provincial executive and should be in a position to inform the Minister and NCOP of 
troubles encountered by municipalities. Arguably, the mandate to be obtained by the 
provincial delegates to the NCOP accommodates the provincial parliament‟s views.  
 
Moreover, the Minister and NCOP must consider the provincial executive and legislative 
powers since they cannot undermine provincial autonomy.68 In Premier of the Western 
Cape v the Minister of Police, the Constitutional Court cautioned that where the 
Constitution confers powers to the provincial executive such authority cannot be unduly 
tampered with.69 The Court instructed that all spheres of government must act in 
accordance with the spirit and letter of the constitutional scheme and utilise the 
intergovernmental principles appropriately.70 The former demonstrates that the veto 
power cannot be exercised without circumspection. For this reason, the Minister and 
NCOP have to give credence to the principles that the Court amplified pertaining to the 
provincial executive authority. Essentially the role to be performed by the Minister and 
NCOP must be remedial in nature. Yet, given the protection of provincial autonomy, the 
veto power should also be perceived as a remedy to aggrieved municipalities when 
confronted with inappropriate interventions. It is bothersome that in the Mogalakwena 
case the aggrieved municipality failed to seek redress in terms of section 139(2) and 
opted to approach the courts for protection. Moreover, the Court failed to elevate the 
constitutional protection afforded to municipalities in this regard.71   
 
                                                          
68
  Ss125(1); 128(1); 132; 110; 114; and 116 of the 1996 Constitution.  
69
  Premier of the Western Cape v the Minister of Police 2013 (CCT 13/13)[2013]ZACC 33 paras 59 - 61.(hereinafter 
Premier of the Western Cape Case). 
70
  Premier of the Western Cape Case at paras 62 - 63.   
71
  Mogalakwena Case at paras 75-77. 
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2.5 The role and responsibilities of the Minister and NCOP  
As guardian of intergovernmental relations, the Minister has an important role to play in 
monitoring the effectiveness of intergovernmental relations mechanisms.72 Accordingly, 
the Minister must exercise oversight over general structures and procedures of 
intergovernmental relations. While the concept of separation of powers is too broad to 
be defined within the context of this study, the Minister from an executive arm must 
independently assess an intervention to decide whether to veto the intervention. This 
determination is of an executive nature and therefore falls subject to scrutiny by the 
NCOP. In executing this role, the Minister should ideally take into context the political 
landscape of the country and the national goals and objectives it wishes to achieve. The 
latter connotes a link in the accountability chain wherein the Minister must support 
provincial governments in executing their mandate.73     
 
For its part, the NCOP should ideally be focussed on being an effective bridge between 
provinces and the national sphere of government. Moreover, it is the legislative arm and 
therefore holds the executive governments to account for its actions. The NCOP is 
constitutionally tasked with a dynamic and complex role.74 For instance, despite holding 
the executive to account in the context of provincial interventions, the NCOP must 
ensure that the provincial interests are also taken into consideration. The multi-faceted 
                                                          
72
  Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005.   
73
  Premier of the Western Cape Case at paras 59 – 64. 
74
  Murray, C. and Simeon, R. “From Paper to Practice: The National Council of Provinces after its first year.” 1999. 
SA Public Law 14, 96. 
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role that it performs contributes to the realisation of co-operative and effective 
government.75  
 
When exercising the veto power, the Minister and NCOP must, in addition to the 
legislative and constitutional frameworks, apply the formal rules and written processes 
applicable to the relevant institutions.76 The Minister is not obliged to implement the 
draft legislation as yet but is required to follow the guidelines for interventions. CoGTA 
has not communicated a standard operating procedure that should ideally be adhered 
to, and for that reason, the manner in which the Minister reaches his/ her decision is not 
formerly stated as yet. In some instances it is unclear whether CoGTA provides written 
reasons or notification of the decision to veto. This is not unlawful since the Constitution 
does not impose such a burden on the Minister but the position is different for the 
NCOP since it has to adhere to all processes prescribed for Parliament. All decisions 
taken by the NCOP, whether to approve or disapprove an intervention must be reached 
by the full house.77 In addition, each delegation has one vote which it casts on behalf of 
the province by the head of its delegation.78 Consequently, the NCOP should require 
each provincial delegation to produce a written instruction or mandates to confirm that 
the provincial legislature has authorised it to vote in a particular way.79 The rationale for 
this approach is due to the nature of the NCOP.80 Its role is to enable provincial 
                                                          
75
  Premier of the Western Cape Case at para 72.   
76
  S65 of the 1996 Constitution and NCOP Rules of the National Council of Provinces 8
th
 ed (2007). 
77
  S65(2) read together with section 70 of the 1996 Constitution. 
78
  S65(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
79
  S65(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
80
  S42(4) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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governments to participate and lobby its interest in the national affairs.81 When it relates 
to interventions its role is to protect the balance of powers between the national, 
provincial and local interests.82 Thus, failure to provide a written mandate as envisaged 
by the Constitution could be argued as rendering the NCOP process unconstitutional.83    
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The veto power demands interplay of complicated legal concepts and practical solutions 
between the multi-level governments in safeguarding autonomous local government. 
Case law confirms that inappropriate implementation of section 139(1) interventions 
could negatively impact on attempts towards ensuring effective government. The veto 
power remains predominantly unregulated, which may inhibit the successes to be 
achieved from this mechanism. The Constitution is unambiguous in the role provincial 
parliament should play yet the provincial parliament appears insignificant in the 
operations of the veto power. According to CoGTA, the draft legislation was a result of 
intense research based on well documented implementation problems associated with f 
past section 139 and 100 interventions. Yet, it fails to highlight the absent regulation of 
the veto power and the significance to be attached to the veto power. The Minister and 
NCOP are tasked by the Constitution to exercise a veto power when required to do so 
per section 139(2) and (3), and therefore operate within an open ended spectrum. The 
next chapter will focus on the veto powers invoked by the Minister and NCOP for the 
last five years, coupled with reasons, legal basis and the methods used by the Minister 
                                                          
81
  S42(4) of the 1996 Constitution. 
82
  Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer Y (2007) 11-15. 
83
  Murray C & Hoffman-Wanderer Y (2007) 23-24. 
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and NCOP in exercising the veto power in terms of sections 139 (2) (b) and 139(3)(b) of 
the Constitution. 
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Chapter 3: The use of veto power in practice  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The discussion on the policy and legal framework for interventions in the previous 
chapter made clear the significance to be attached to the veto power for the Minister 
and the NCOP.84 As a constitutional checks and balancing mechanism it is justifiably 
assumed that the veto power is an ideal mechanism to circumvent unnecessary 
tensions between various government spheres.85 These tensions would normally 
manifest in protracted litigation and prolonged IGR battles.86 Thus, the veto power is 
imperative to avoid undue interference from the provincial sphere into the autonomy of 
municipalities.87  
 
The above-mentioned is especially  critical, if one considers the concerns raised with 
respect to the utilisation of section 139(1) interventions by the  Select Committee on 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs on its activities undertaken during the 
4th Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014).88 The Committee expressed its difficulty in 
determining „why provincial governments would intervene in some municipalities with 
problems and not in others’, thus implying that double standards might exist.89   
 
                                                          
84
  Ss 139(1)(a);(b) and (c) and 139(2)(b)and 139(3)(b) of the 1996 Constitution. 
85
  De Visser J & Steytler N (2012) 15:24 -25. 
86
. Mkhwanazi S ‘Government counts the cost of court action by municipalities’ The Newage 08 August 2014. 
86
  S40 of the 1996 Constitution. 
87
  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Select Committee on 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs on its activities undertaken during the 4th Parliament (May 2009 
– March 2014) (2014)1;2 and 3 of 24. (hereinafter 4
th
 Term Legacy Report). 
88
  Parliament 4th Term Legacy Report (2014) 2 of 24. 
89
  Parliament 4th Term Legacy Report (2014) 2 of 24. 
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This is problematic for many reasons. First interventions operate within an 
intergovernmental system of governance; therefore consistency in addressing 
problematic municipalities must be entrenched. In addition, enabling good local 
government demands all spheres to deliver on its mandate. As a result, the veto power 
must ensure accountability from all spheres of government to all citizens. This is the 
oversight role envisaged from the Constitution and promised by the WPLG.90 Therefore, 
in instances where it is deemed that national and provincial governments have failed 
local government, the veto power should detect such failures. Yet, Powell argues the 
extent of such failure is often unknown and unaccounted for. With the result that 
provincial and national governments continue to be unchecked for providing inadequate 
support to municipalities.  
  
Empirical data on section 139(1) interventions invoked during 2010 to 2014 is 
presented, which include an overview of all the interventions during this period. A 
detailed description of instances where interventions were terminated is also presented. 
Further to these, the role, nature and actions of all stakeholders, namely the 
municipality, provincial government, Minister and NCOP are also documented.  
It should be underlined that at this stage of this study, only the facts of each case study 
are presented with no analysis being provided. Thus, this chapter only establishes the 
basis for the analysis to be conducted in the next chapter, i.e. chapter 4.  
 
 
 
                                                          
90
 WPLG (1998) 38-46. 
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3.2  Overview of interventions during 2010 – 2014 
According to the review as conducted by CoGTA on section 139 interventions, the 
nature of the problems experienced by municipalities relate to at least three broad 
categories as noted represented in table1 below. 
 
 Table1:     Broad Categories for Interventions Cited by CoGTA91 
Governance Challenges persist in the political/administrative interface: e.g. conflicts 
between top management and councillors and political in-fighting; there 
may be non-adherence to the Code of Conduct for Councillors and inability 
of a Council to perform as required by legislation. Often cited is poor or non-
performance of top management, lack of proper organisational structures 
and vacant post in key management positions (e.g. technical, engineering, 
planning). 
Financial 
Financial mismanagement: this includes a lack of adequate systems and capacity 
to effectively manage financial resources; e.g. insufficient revenue  raising due to 
weak billing and tariff systems, and weak debt collection policies; poor budgeting; 
lack of internal controls related to revenue management allowing for fraud, and 
misuse of municipal funds; lack of controls through internal audit and risk 
management committees.  
Service 
Delivery 
Sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution clearly set out the service delivery 
obligations of municipalities, this is often highly uneven and may significantly lag 
demand; there may be high debt levels for bulk water and electricity purchases, 
and little or no spending on repairs and maintenance, resulting in distribution 
losses, breakdowns of systems, or services not rendered.  
 
With reference to the table above, it is important to distinguish the financial category 
pertaining to section 139(1) intervention from section 139(5) intervention.92 This is 
important since the veto power only applies to section 139(1) intervention. Also, these 
financial interventions are discretionary in nature since it falls under section 139(1) as 
read together with section 136 of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA). In a 
nutshell, the latter permits different types of support that may be rendered in terms of a 
                                                          
91
 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Briefing to the Select Committee on Finance on 
the support provided by the department to municipalities under administration in terms of section 139 of the 
Constitution, and the need for legislation to regulate its implementation held 11 September 2013  (2013) 6 of 51. 
(hereinafter SC Finance Briefing (2013)). 
92
  139(5) of the 1996 Constitution.  
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139(1) discretionary intervention. However, section 139(5) interventions relate to 
mandatory financial interventions in terms of section 139(5) as read together with 
section 139 of the MFMA.  
 
Interventions during 2010 – 2014 are represented in table2 below:  
Table 2: Geographic Locations and Nature of Interventions93 
Prov Type Municipality Nature Duration 
KZN Total number of interventions during period under review = 10 
 S139(
1) 
Indaka Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration 
Duration: March 2010- Current 
(Extended on 31 July 2012) 
 
 S139(
1) 
Okhahlamb
a 
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: March 2010 - 30 June 
2012 
 
 S139(
1) 
Umsunduzi Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: May 2010 - 13 December 
2011 
 
 S139(
1) 
Mtubatuba Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration 
Duration: November 2012- Current 
 
 S139(
1) 
Imbabazan
e 
Grounds: Governance & Political 
party conflicts 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration 
Duration: January 2013- Current 
 
 S139(
1) 
Abaqulusi Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration 
Duration: March 2013- Current 
 
 S139(
1) 
MFMA 
Umvoti Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration  
Duration: July 2013- Current 
 
 S136 
MFMA  
Umzinyathi 
District 
Grounds: Financial 
Administration 
Duration: April 2013- Current 
 
                                                          
93
   Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Website: available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=326 (accessed 1 July 2014). 
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 S136 
MFMA 
Uthukela 
District 
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: May 2013- Current 
 
 S136 
MFMA 
Ugu District Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: May 2013- Current 
 
NW Total number of interventions during period under review = 8 
 S139
(1) 
Moses 
Kotane 
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administrative  
Duration: July 2010 – May 2011 
 
 S139
(1) 
Swaing  Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administrative  
Duration: July 2010 – May 2011 
 
 S139
(1) 
Madibeng  Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administrative. 
Duration: July 2010 – May 2011 
 
 S139
(1) 
Madibeng Grounds  
Vetoed:  By Minister 
Duration February 2014 – 
 
 S139
(1) 
Mafikeng  Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administrative 
Duration: July 2010 – May 2011 
 
 S139
(1) 
Maquassi 
Hills 
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administrative 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration 
Duration: April 2013- Current 
 
 S139
(1) 
Matlosana  Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administrative 
Vetoed:  By NCOP 
Duration: April 2013 – Nov 2014 
 
 S139
(1) 
Ditsobotla Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administrative 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration 
Duration: April 2013 
 
MP Total number of interventions during period under review = 4 
 S139
(1) 
Thembisile 
Hani 
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: April 2010 
 
 S139
(1) 
Emalahleni  Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: April 2013- Current 
 
 S139
(1) 
Bushbuckrid
ge  
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
S139(1)(b): Municipality placed 
under Administration 
Duration: April 2013- Current 
 
 S139
(1) 
Emalahleni  Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: 17 April 2013- Current 
 
FS Total number of interventions during period under review = 3 
 S139
(1) 
Nala Local Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: December 2010 - May 
2011 
 S139
(1) 
Masilonyana Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: December 2010 - May 
2011  
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 S139
(1) 
Naledi Grounds: Governance; Financial 
Administration & Council 
Dysfunctionality 
Duration: May 2010 - May 2011 
 
WC Total number of interventions during period under review = 4 
 S139
(1) 
Stellenbosch Grounds: Governance  Duration: April 2010- April 2010 
 
 S139
(1) 
Swellendam Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Vetoed:    By Minister 
Duration: Sept 2012- Nov 2012 
 
 S139
(4) 
Oudtshoorn Grounds: Budget & Revenue 
Raising Mechanism  
Duration: Nov 2012- Feb 2013 
 
 S139
(4) 
Overberg 
District 
Grounds: Budget & Revenue 
Raising Mechanism 
Duration: July 2010- Oct 2010 
 
GP Total number of interventions during period under review = 1 
 S139
(1) 
Nokeng Tsa 
Taemane 
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: Oct 2010-  May 2011 
 
EC Total number of interventions during period under review = 2 
 S139
(1) 
Sunday‟s 
River Valley 
Grounds: Governance & 
Financial Administration 
Duration: Jan 2010- May 2011 
 S139
(1) 
Mnquma Grounds: Governance  Duration: Mar 2013- Sept 2013 
 
LP Total number of interventions during period under review = 1 
  Mogalekwen
a 
Grounds: Governance 
Vetoed: By the High Court of 
Gauteng  
Duration: Mar 2013- Sept 2013 
 
NC Total number of interventions during period under review = 0 
 
Following from the above table, it becomes clear that a total of 33 interventions have 
occurred across provincial boundaries from 2010 to 2014. However, of these only two 
cases were subject to the veto power. The first case relates to the intervention brought 
by the Western Cape Provincial Government into Swellendam Local Municipality in 
October 2012. The second case relates to the intervention brought by the North West 
Province into Madibeng Local Municipality in July 2014.  
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3.3 Case study : Western Cape Provincial Government intervention into the 
Swellendam Local Municipality in October 2012 
 
3.3.1 Context triggering intervention 
Swellendam Local Municipality was governed by a coalition of the Democratic Alliance 
(DA)  and African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) since the African National 
Congress(ANC) and DA both held four seats while the ACDP held (one) seat. A 
stalemate arose when the ACDP member was removed by his Party. As a result, 
Council failed to quorate since March 2012, but the ACDP member was later reinstated 
by his Party in reaction to a Cape High Court order delivered on 17 April 2012.94  
 
Community protests transpired due to the political instability. Protests were rather 
violent and involved vandalising private businesses and public properties.95 Moreover, 
the protests involved not only local residents but also officials from the municipality.96 
These protests were not related to service delivery but rather related to the extension of 
the serving municipal manager‟s contract.97 This was due to the fact that the municipal 
manager was perceived by the community and staff members to be favouring the DA 
council members.98 Accordingly, during periods when a shift in political power occurred, 
                                                          
94
  Western Cape Department of Local Government available at 
  http://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2013/July/municipal-councils-june-2013.pdf  (accessed 1 March 2014). 
95
  Western Cape  Government Ministry of Local Government : Media Statement: Swellendam Municipality Update 
27 February 2013 available at 
  http://www.westerncape.gov.za/news/swellendam-municipality-update-0 (accessed 1 March 2014). 
(hereinafter referred to as Media Statement). 
96
  Western Cape Government (2013) Media Statement.  
97
  Western Cape Government (2013) Media Statement.  
98
  Western Cape Government Briefing notes submitted in terms of the Local Government Support Group (LGSG) 
during June to September 2013. (on file with author).  
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the municipal manager was replaced by an official, at a junior level within the 
administration, and widely regarded to be affiliated to the ANC caucus.99 Ultimately, 
service delivery was compromised due to the malfunctioning administration. The 
situation reached alarming levels, prompting National Treasury [NT] to caution the 
municipality that it would subject it to a section 216(2) process of the Constitution, 
whereby its portion of funds allocated in terms of the Local Government Equitable Share 
would be withheld if the municipality failed to meet the MFMA prescriptions.100  
 
Despite reinstatement of the ACDP councillor, who previously supported a coalition with 
the DA but subsequent to his reinstatement supported the ANC, the stalemate in 
Council continued.101. Consequently, a proposed adjustment budget was not considered 
and the tabling of the 2012/13 Draft Annual budget and Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP) were not approved within the prescribed timeframes.102 In addition, the senior 
management of the municipality was severely compromised. For instance, the contract 
of the municipal manager was soon to expire, coupled with the fact that three of five 
senior posts as provided for in the approved organogram were vacant, namely the 
Director: Technical Services; Director: Community Services and Director: Corporate 
                                                          
99
  Western Cape Government Briefing notes submitted in terms of the Local Government Support Group (LGSG) 
during June to September 2013. (on file with author).  
100
 National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa Decision to invoke section 216(2) of the Constitution against 
municipalities in breach of section 126 of the MFMA (reference letter -M3/4/3/2 (3551/12) (2012).  
101
  Western Cape Government Briefing notes submitted in terms of the Local Government Support Group (LGSG) 
during June to September 2013. (on file with author). 
102
  Western Cape Government (2013) Media Statement. 
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Services. Moreover, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) was placed on sick leave on 
more than one occasion, and for lengthy periods.103 
Aggravating the state of affairs was the number of litigation instituted by councillors. A 
total breakdown of litigation costs for this period is not available. However, more than 
three High Court proceedings were instituted in the Western Cape High Court during 
2012.104  It became clear that the municipality was in desperate need of assistance. The 
provincial government, where an outright DA majority exits, cautioned the municipality 
that it needed to fill all vacant posts or service delivery would be seriously 
compromised.105 The municipality responded that nothing had changed to create a 
reasonable expectation that the Council meeting could be successfully facilitated to 
extend the appointment of the acting municipal manager before it expired on 5 
September 2012.106 In response, the DA-led provincial government alerted the 
municipality that failure to fill senior posts would jeopardise the functioning of the 
administration. Moreover, that it would intervene to extend the acting arrangement of 
the municipal manager if the municipality fails to do so.107   
 
                                                          
103
  Western Cape Government Department of Local Government Regional Monitoring Teams Municipal 
Governance Reports for the period ended June 2012 available at 
http://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2012/11/swellendam-municipality-rmt.pdf (accessed 1 March 
2014).(hereinafter RMT Reports). 
104
  Western Cape Government Department of Local Government (2012) RMT Report.  
105
  Western Cape Government Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning 
Letter to the Speaker of the Swellendam Local Municipality dated 21 August 2012 (Reference 
3/11/2/27(2012/1825) (2012). (on file with author). 
106
  Swellendam Local Municipality Letter to the Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning dated 27 August 2012 (No Reference) (2012).(on file with author). 
107
  Western Cape Government Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning  
Letter to the Speaker of the Swellendam Local Municipality dated 21 August 2012 (Reference 
3/11/2/27(2012/1825) (2012).(on file with author).  
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3.3.2 Action by the provincial government  
Despite being abreast of all political and administrative hurdles confronting the 
municipality, the provincial government failed to provide any concrete support. To add to 
an already bad situation, no genuine efforts were instituted by either the DA or ANC 
councillors to overcome the impasse in Council. The provincial government consulted 
both the DA and ANC councillors to reach an agreement on the appointment of the 
municipal manager and other senior positions, with the extension of the municipal 
manager‟s contract being the priority for the provincial government.108.  
 
Accordingly, the provincial executive invoked section 139(1)(b) to effect the extension of 
the municipal manager‟s appointment for a maximum period of three months per section 
54A(2A)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act. A directive was issued to the Municipality and 
reference was made to section 54A of the above-mentioned Act. Also, the municipal 
council was requested to adhere to the requirements of section 60 of the MFMA. The 
latter provisions were the executive obligations, which the intervention was based on.109 
The Mayor replied that the municipality could not meet the request, a response he 
attributed to continuous walk outs by councillors to consider the item on the agenda of 
council meetings. The Mayor requested the provincial government to extend the 
employment contract as proposed in the directive.110  
                                                          
108
  Western Cape Government Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning 
Cabinet Submission dated 29 August 2012 (Cabinet Minute No. 237/2012) (2012). (on file with 
author)(hereinafter Cabinet Submission).    
109
  Western Cape Government Cabinet Submission (2012). 
110
  Western Cape Government Cabinet Submission (2012). 
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3.3.3 Response from the Minister  
The Minister disapproved the intervention on 4 October 2012 and instead suggested a 
cooperative government approach be adopted. The Minister made no outright 
recommendation as to the appointment of a new municipal manager. Once the Minister 
exercised the veto power, it basically created a situation where the municipality was 
without a municipal manager as of 4 October 2012.  
 
No clear mandate was presented to the province or the municipality. However, 
engagements were arranged on a political and administrative level and clear roles and 
responsibilities were established emanating from the engagements between CoGTA 
and the provincial government.111 The Minister also consulted the local municipality 
separately, whilst also attending a joint meeting with the community residents to discuss 
the municipal affairs that gave rise to the intervention in question.112   
 
Political office holders for province and national government entered into negotiations 
on how they were to support Swellendam municipality during October.113 At the time the 
Swellendam community was informed that a cooperative arrangement would be 
implemented to overcome the challenges confronting the municipality. Moreover, a 
comprehensive support plan was developed with clear roles and responsibilities for both 
provincial and national government to execute. This support included the secondment of 
                                                          
111
  Western Cape Government (2013) Media Statement. 
112
  Western Cape Government (2013) Media Statement. 
113
  Western Cape Government (2013) Media Statement. 
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an official of the provincial Department of Local Government as acting municipal 
manager for a period of six months from October 2012 to March 2013.114 The Minister 
did not provide a report to the Select Committee on Governance and Traditional 
Affairs.115 
 
3.3.4  Response by the NCOP 
The NCOP did not take any measures after receiving the notice of intervention. It 
merely endorsed the plan by Minister, province and municipality.116 There is no 
information available that suggests the NCOP consulted the province or the 
municipality. The NCOP also did not request from Minister to brief the select committee 
on Governance and Traditional Affairs about the situation in Swellendam, to ascertain 
whether the local residents were pleased with the outcomes of the cooperative 
arrangement coordinated by the Minister.   
  
                                                          
114
  Western Cape Government (2013) Media Statement. 
115
  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Website: available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=326 (accessed 1 July 2014). 
116
  Western Cape Government Department of Local Government Letter directed to the NCOP dated September 
2012 (2012).  
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3.4 Case study : North West Provincial Government into the Madibeng Local 
Municipality in July 2014 
 
3.4.1 Context triggering intervention 
The provincial executive previously intervened in the municipality during 2010 for a 
period of six months, i.e. April to October 2010117 The intervention was extended at the 
beginning of November 2010 and concluded in May 2011 since the next local 
government elections were to be held. It was envisaged that the new political leadership 
would bring to an end challenges faced by the municipality. Unfortunately, that was not 
the case with the municipality experiencing the same problems post the elections. In 
December 2012, a further intervention was brought by the province and set aside by the 
Minister in January 2013. According to the provincial government, the interventions 
were a consequence of the non-compliance by the municipality with regulatory and 
governance requirements.118 As challenges remained unaddressed, the province then 
sought to bring a further intervention in February 2014.119 The Minister set aside both 
the 2012 and 2014 interventions and instead implemented a support plan in terms of 
section 154 of the Constitution. 120 The actions of the Minister are detailed in section 
3.4.3 below.    
 
                                                          
117
 Matlawe E Madibeng Local Municipality Close Out Report (2010) 4 of 16. (on file with author).  
118
 Matlawe E (2010) 4- 6 of 16. 
119
 Matlawe E (2010) 4- 6 of 16. 
120
 Matlawe E (2010) 4 -6 of 16. 
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The problems confronting the municipality relate to serious financial mismanagement 
and maladministration and corruption.121 The extent of the problem was so serious that 
the municipality was listed in Proclamation No: R72 of 2009 for the Special Investigating 
Unit to probe.122  In addition, countless litigation occurred between the municipality and 
its officials, covering a range of legal issues of matters of theft and corruption to unfair 
dismissal and disputed human resource practices.123   
 
The dire administrative situation of the municipality negatively impacted service delivery. 
For instance, it was subjected to severe financial challenges (e.g. revenue shortages 
and cash flow problems) for ten consecutive years, which had a knock on effect on the 
financial sustainability and delivery of basic services. For example, provisioning of 
water; sanitation; electricity, and refuse removal was compromised.124 As a result, many 
service delivery protests occurred, which were often violent in nature, and resulting in at 
least four deaths.125  The community‟s dismay related to poor service provisions, 
coupled with scores of corruption and maladministration.126 In an effort to curtail flagrant 
disregard of its local government mandate, the local residents established a Residents 
Rates Payers Association and withheld payment of services to the municipality. The 
monies were held in a separate trust account, which signified a high level of distrust 
towards the municipality.127  
 
                                                          
121
  Matlawe E (2010) 4 -6 of 16. 
122
  Matlawe E (2010) 4 -6 of 16. 
123
  Matlawe E (2010) 4 -6 of 16. 
124
  Matlawe E (2010) 2 -4 of 16.    
125
  Sapa ‘Madibeng municipality out under administration’ City Press 11 February 2014. 
126
  Sapa ‘Madibeng municipality out under administration’ City Press 11 February 2014. 
127
  Sapa ‘Madibeng municipality out under administration’ City Press 11 February 2014. 
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The initial intervention in 2010 aimed to appoint an administrator to attain sound 
municipal communication, both internally and externally. Furthermore, it was to ensure 
alignment of the turnaround strategy and intervention plan for the development of a 
financial recovery plan.128 Progress was made with outcomes related to service delivery 
issues; finances; local economic development, and public participation.129 Remarkably, 
the financial recovery plan was prepared as a discretionary provincial intervention in 
terms of Section 136 of the MFMA as read together with section 139(1) of the 
Constitution.130 The provincial government collaborated with CoGTA and requested 
National Treasury, with support from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), 
to prepare a financial recovery plan to address the financial challenges of the 
Municipality.131  
 
The administrator made a number of observations in the Close Out Report.132 For 
example, it was noted that the deployment of an administrator to a municipality without 
a support team will fail to expedite support efforts.133 In addition, it was observed that a 
lack of provincial support is a major factor impeding local governments development. 134 
Specific attention was also drawn to the province‟s poor understanding of its support 
role in interventions, as captured below:135  
 
                                                          
128
  Matlawe E (2010) 5 of 16. 
129
  Matlawe E (2010) 9-12 of 16. 
130
  Matlawe E (2010) (2010) 3 of 16.  
131
  Matlawe E (2010) (2010) 12 of 16.  
132
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
133
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
134
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
135
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
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„Support by the Department of Human Settlement to secure land for housing development 
including unblocking some of the housing projects was lacking in many respects. The municipality 
was inundated with complaints about the state of the provincial roads, but the responsible 
department lacked the resources to address the situation, although there was willingness at all 
times to address the situation, although there was willingness at all times to address the situation, 
the department was financial constraint [sic]’.136 
 
The Administrator strongly recommended both national and provincial governments to 
support, capacitate and monitor municipalities in such a manner that they do not reach 
a stage of desperation. Provinces ought to develop early warning mechanisms to 
intervene at the right time before problems escalate out of control.137 The Administrator 
added that officials deployed by CoGTA to support the municipality were not well versed 
with municipal operations, and struggled to provide adequate support. For example, no 
funds were granted to support the municipality and it had to carry the intervention costs, 
thus defeating the purpose of the intervention.138 
 
3.4.2  Action taken by the provincial government  
After the 2010 intervention problems persisted, the province invoked an intervention in 
December 2012 in terms of section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution. The intervention aimed 
to provide for the take-over of the executive obligations and divest Council‟s authority in 
the Administrator. No directive was issued to the municipality. When the municipality 
                                                          
136
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
137
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
138
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
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became aware of the intervention, it sought legal action.139 The municipality felt 
aggrieved by the intended intervention, arguing that it was unfair, premature and 
malicious, and attempted to stop the intervention by means of a court interdict. 
However, the Minister quickly vetoed the intervention.   
 
In February 2014, the province again intervened in the municipality in terms of section 
139(1)(b) of the Constitution to appoint an Administrator to implement the support plan 
that emanated  from the Minister‟s veto in 2013.140 The intervention was estimated to 
last for a minimum period of six months and a maximum period of 12 months. The basis 
for the intervention was the continued problems pertaining to governance, financial 
management and service delivery. Particular attention was drawn to the failure of the 
new political leadership‟s failure to implement the support plan. The new leadership 
replaced the former office bearers in January 2014.   
 
 
3.4.3 Response from the Minister 
CoGTA received a representation from the North West Member of Executive Council 
(MEC) for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, which served as a notice of the 
December 2012 intervention.141  As noted above, the intervention was to last for a 
minimum period of six months and a maximum period of 12 months. The intervention 
provided for the assumption of all executive duties from Council even though the 
                                                          
139
  Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Presentation to the National Council of 
Provinces Select Committee On Cooperative Governance And Traditional Affairs on Madibeng Local Municipality 
Interventions held July 2014 (2014) 2-3 of 11. (hereinafter CoGTA Madibeng Presentation). 
140
  CoGTA Madibeng Presentation (2014) 2-3 of 11. 
141
  CoGTA Madibeng Presentation (2014 )2-3 of 11.  
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problems were not caused by the current leadership.142 No real attempt was made to 
offer support to the municipality. The intervention was invoked notwithstanding the 
recommendation by the 2010 Administrator cautioning that future interventions should 
be avoided at all costs.143 Furthermore, no formal notification was sent to the 
municipality.  
 
The Minister, together with a Task Team in the North West Provincial Government, 
conducted an analysis on the state of municipalities in the province. The outcome of the 
investigation was to inform the support efforts and disciplinary actions to be taken to 
address challenges.144 In this way, the Minister engaged both parties prior to the 
determination to intervene in 2012. In fact, when the Minister became aware of the 2012 
proposed intervention, he approached the provincial government to request the Task 
Team to investigate whether such an intervention was warranted. The Task Team had a 
clear mandate and submitted a report with recommendations in the first quarter of 2013. 
The investigation conceded that the intervention in terms of 139(1)(b) of the Constitution 
was premature and punitive. Therefore, the Minister exercised the veto power and 
terminated the intervention.145  
 
With respect to the February 2014 intervention, the Minister also vetoed this 
intervention, and once again requested a support plan to be implemented. A Ministerial 
Support Team was established for this purpose and the scope of the support outlined in 
                                                          
142
  CoGTA Madibeng Presentation (2014 )2-3 of 11. 
143
  Matlawe E (2010) 16 of 16. 
144
  CoGTA Madibeng Presentation (2014 )2-3 of 11. 
145
  CoGTA Madibeng Presentation (2014 )5-7 of 11. 
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a Terms of Reference (TOR).The latter comprehensively dealt with all challenges 
confronting the municipality. One of the actions the Minister inculcated after vetoing the 
intervention was to ensure that an official from CoGTA is appointed to the position of 
acting municipal manager following the suspension of the municipal manager. The 
acting municipal manager was tasked with monitoring, supervising and implementing 
the recommendations of the Ministerial Support Team. Progress achieved was reported 
to the Select Committee on Governance and Traditional Affairs.146 
 
3.4.4 Response from the NCOP 
The NCOP assessed the feedback presented by CoGTA. In addition, the NCOP also 
conducted an oversight visit during April 2014. The NCOP requested an independent 
assessment of the state of affairs in the municipality.147 Also, the NCOP approved of the 
support plan put in place.  
 
 
  
                                                          
146
  CoGTA Madibeng Presentation (2014) 10 of 11. 
147
  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Committee Assess Water and Sanitation Challenges in Madibeng 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=6523.(Accessed 1 March 2014). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
A few observations could be drawn from the case studies as presented in this chapter. 
The Minister and NCOP displayed sound understanding of the legal regulatory 
framework. For instance, the Minister was quick to respond to both notifications of 
intervention by the Western Cape and North West province. Also, the Minister complied 
with the legal injunctions in that he checked whether the province provided support to 
the municipality prior to the decision to intervene. Outcomes for the interventions were 
also assessed. Whether the intervention would be curative in nature was evaluated on a 
factual basis. The actions of both provinces and municipalities were taken into account 
to determine the appropriate legal processes to be followed. Specifically, it was 
considered whether the intervention was appropriate and whether the correct 
intervention steps were followed. For example, when the provinces intervened, the 
Minister would check that a directive was issued. The Minister also checked whether the 
intervention step implemented by the province was the least intrusive. Therefore, the 
Minster supported the decision of deploying administrative officials to act in the capacity 
of municipal manager in terms of a section 154 support plan rather than utilising 
intervention for this purpose.     
 
The Minister demonstrated commitment to the intergovernmental principles in that he 
scheduled consultations with the provinces, municipalities, and local residents. In doing 
so, the Minister entrenched the cooperative governance model amongst the spheres of 
government and jointly accounted to the local residents on the state of affairs in the 
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municipality. Not only does this provide accountability to the residents, it also manifestly 
holds all of government responsible for the recovery of the municipality. 
 
A poor regulatory framework for interventions certainly compromises the processes to 
be followed when determining to terminate an intervention. Whether this is the main 
reason for not using the veto power more in practise is uncertain. It is established; 
however, that in the absence of a sound regulatory framework the methodology and 
protocols used for the veto power was developed by the institutions on an ad hoc basis.  
The data documented the context triggering the intervention and the responses by all 
stakeholders. Concerns by the Minister and NCOP for the limited use of the veto power 
in practise failed to emerge. While there are definite efforts to improve oversight of 
interventions, there seems no impetus to concretise outcomes for the veto power.  
 
While positive observations are raised above concerning the utilisation of the veto 
power, it cannot be denied that it is too infrequently utilised as a legal tool to assist 
municipalities, which is worrisome since it is provided for in the Constitution. Notably of 
concern in this regard is that 33 interventions occurred from 2010 to 2014, yet only two 
cases were vetoed. The overview on section 139 interventions signifies clear problems 
in its implementation but still only two cases were vetoed. It does not seem plausible 
that all 33 interventions were not eligible for the Minister or the NCOP to exercise their 
veto powers. The next chapter argues that there is inconsistency in the application of 
the veto power, coupled with presenting attributing factors for this inconsistency in 
practise.  
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Chapter 4: Why the veto power is failing 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 the context and procedure in which the veto power is exercised was 
discussed. The veto power when exercised has shown to have positive outcomes for 
municipalities and local residents. Notwithstanding sound constitutional safeguards 
provided by the veto power its efficacy lies in its implementation in practise.148As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the veto power was only applied to two of the 33 
interventions. The latter signals a cog in the intergovernmental accountability chain. 
Although the Constitutional design establishes a place and role for the veto power, at a 
conceptual level there appears little evidence to concretise this in practise. Arguably, 
the failure to concretise the veto power in practice may be attributed to shortcomings in 
current operations of the Minister and the NCOP.    
 
This chapter argues that a degree of inconsistency exists in the application of the veto 
power. To illustrate this inconsistency, two case studies concerning interventions where 
the Minister and NCOP failed to apply the veto power where such action was actually 
warranted, will be discussed. These case studies comprise the North West Provincial 
Government‟s intervention into the Matlosana Local Municipality in April 2013, and the 
Limpopo Provincial Government‟s intervention into the Mogalakwena Local Municipality 
in June 2014. These case studies highlight the extent of the inconsistent application of 
                                                          
148
  Department of Cooperative Governance Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Intervention Bill 
Application of Sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution Practitioners’ Roundtable dated 13 March 2014 (2014). 
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the veto power.149 The attributing factors for this inconsistency are analysed, and which 
relate to three key factors, namely the poor regulatory framework; political contestation, 
and lack of accountability on the parts of the Minister and the NCOP.150  
 
In brief, the discussion demonstrates how the Minister and NCOP inconsistently apply 
the veto power. With respect to the legal framework, despite no directive being issued 
and drastic intervention steps being implemented, the Minister and NCOP failed to 
institute corrective action against these interventions. Also, where the incorrect type of 
intervention was followed, for instance a discretionary financial intervention as opposed 
to a mandatory financial intervention.151 The Minister and NCOP tacitly permitted the 
flawed process. Of concern are the Minister and the NCOP‟s inadequate response to 
constructive evidence-based feedback from the judiciary and the select committee of 
the NCOP on undue interventions. The discussion here is critical for the 
recommendations provided in the concluding chapter. 
  
                                                          
149
  Department of Cooperative Governance Intergovernmental Monitoring, Support and Intervention Bill 
Application of Sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution Practitioners’ Roundtable dated 13 March 2014 (2014) 
Section B- Presentations on past interventions (hereinafter (IMSI Bill Roundtable). 
150
  South African Local Government Association Joint Workshop on the Application of Section 139 and the Need for 
Legislation dated 2 November 2010 (2010 (hereinafter SALGA Joint Workshop). 
151
  Parliament 4
th  
Term Legacy Report (2014)15:-25 – 26. 
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4.2 Case study: North West Provincial Government intervention into the 
Matlosana Local Municipality in- April 2013 
 
4.2.1 Context triggering intervention  
Community unrest was prompted by political infighting within ANC factions.152 Matters 
were exacerbated by the Council‟s inability to collect municipal debt and to enforce 
credit control policies. Also, the Municipality failed to honour its financial statutory 
obligations, including its non-payment of bulk electricity and bulk water accounts to 
Eskom and the Midvaal Water Board, respectively.153 
 
The Provincial Government was aware of the poor financial management issues 
experienced by the Municipality prior to the political power change from the one ANC 
faction to the other.154 The newly established ANC leadership expected the Provincial 
Government to provide the necessary support and assistance to the Municipality in 
terms of section 154 of the Constitution.155 In this regard, the Municipality took initiative 
and communicated to the Provincial Government its willingness to meet in order to 
discuss its dire financial situation.156 In doing so, the Municipality‟s new leadership most 
probably wanted to give effect to the recommendations as provided in the already 
                                                          
152
  Maje O ‘City of Matlosana lambasted by AG’ Taung Daily News 9 October 2013.  
153
  Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Briefing to the Select Committee on 
Appropriations on the support provided by the department to municipalities under administration in terms of 
section 139 of the Constitution held 28 January 2014 (2014) 26. .(hereinafter SC Appropriations Briefing). 
154
  CoGTA SC Finance Briefing (2013) 22. 
155
  CoGTA SC Finance Briefing (2013) 22. 
156
  CoGTA SC Finance Briefing (2013) 22. 
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mentioned investigation in 2012.157 Consequently, a meeting was scheduled for 
February 2013 between these two stakeholders.158  
 
At the meeting of February 2013 the Provincial Government merely communicated to 
the Municipality that an Administrator must be appointed to assist, and that an 
intervention is required for the purpose of addressing problems within the municipal 
administration.159 The appointment of the Administrator was premised on the 
Municipality‟s perceived incompetent financial team who lacked the necessary skills to 
address financial problems associated with the Municipality.160  
 
The Provincial Government indicated its intention to intervene, a move that was 
immediately challenged by the Municipality. The latter argued that since the new 
leadership came into power it took measures to address shortcomings and while 
problems do persist, that the Municipality was acting in good faith. In amplification, the 
Municipality contended that the problems persisted prior to the new leadership, thus that 
it was not their (i.e. the new leadership) doing.  
 
 
                                                          
157
  CoGTA SC Finance Briefing (2013) 22. 
158
  CoGTA SC Finance Briefing (2013) 22. 
159
  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa Report of the Select Committee on Co-operative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs on the intervention in Matlosana Local Municipality dated 10 September 2013 (2013). 
(hereinafter Matlosana Report). 
160
  Parliament Matlosana Report (2013) 4 of 8. .  
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4.2.2 Action taken by the Provincial Government    
On 19 March 2013, the provincial executive resolved to intervene in the Municipality in 
terms of section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution. The intervention was aimed at addressing 
administrative, governance and more specifically poor financial management in the 
Municipality.161 The Provincial Government sought an Administrator and two financial 
experts to assume the functions of taking over the financial management of the 
municipality.  
 
It should be highlighted that a directive was not issued by the provincial executive. In 
response, the Municipality felt aggrieved by the decision to intervene and took an 
executive committee (EXCO) decision refusing to accept the proposed intervention.162  
 
The intervention outcomes were obscured since the intervention resulted in violent 
protest action and exorbitant costs for the appointment of an administrator and two 
financial experts with little to no benefit of the Municipality.163 These officials were 
denied access to the municipal premises for the five month period applicable to the 
intervention. As a result, National Treasury performed the tasks these officials were 
supposed to perform.164 Nevertheless, the Provincial Government still went ahead to 
recover the costs for these appointees from the Municipality.  
                                                          
161
  Ss 41 and 139(1) of the 1996 Constitution.   
162
  Parliament Matlosana Report (2013) 4 of 8. . 
163
  Maje O ‘City of Matlosana lambasted by AG’ Taung Daily News 9 October 2013. 
164
  Parliament Matlosana Report (2013) 5 of 8. 
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4.2.3 Response from the Minister  
The Minister supported the Provincial Government‟s decision to intervene, noting that 
the intervention was necessary bearing in mind the serious financial mismanagement 
practices associated with the Municipality.165 CoGTA‟s main focus was the outstanding 
debt owed by the Municipality to the amount of R980-million. 166 Despite serious 
procedural flaws on the part of the Provincial Government, the Minister proved to be 
unwilling to apply the veto power.167  
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Minister independently consulted the 
Municipality.168 Also, there is no documentation requesting the Provincial Government 
to identify prior support initiatives to the Municipality. Alternatively, to consider 
cooperative governance arrangements that could be entered into to provide support 
through other means.169 Furthermore, no evidence is available that confirms a CoGTA 
Ministerial Task Team was established, coupled with the fact that no mandate was 
established to ascertain the true state of affairs from the Municipality. It appears that the 
Minister did not feel empowered to set aside the intervention on the basis of the serious 
financial implications.170 The distinction between section 139(1) and 139(5) is critical in 
this regard. If the Minister viewed this intervention to be a compulsory financial 
intervention, then the correct process the Provincial Government had to follow was in 
terms of section 139(5) of the Constitution. Therefore, if the incorrect type of 
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  Parliament Matlosana Report (2013) 3 of 8. 
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  Parliament Matlosana Report (2013) 4 of 8. 
167
  Parliament Matlosana Report (2013) 5 of 8. 
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  CoGTA SC Finance Briefing  (2013) 22. 
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  CoGTA SC Appropriations Briefing (2014) 26.  
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intervention was initiated, namely in terms of section 139(1), then the Minister should 
have vetoed the intervention for failing to comply with the applicable legal framework.  
However, a turn-around strategy was developed by NT to support the Municipality with 
its financial challenges. This strongly suggests that a section 139(5) intervention was 
required since NT leads in these interventions. The veto power does not apply and 
CoGTA must play a support role in overseeing the coordination of support efforts.171  
 
4.2.4 Response from the NCOP 
The NCOP took a decision to conduct an oversight visit on 21 August 2013 to establish 
whether the intervention must be approved or vetoed.172 For this purposes, the NCOP 
sent a delegation to conduct an independent evaluation of the state of affairs at the 
Municipality.173 More specifically, the main objectives of the oversight visit were to 
determine whether procedural requirements for the intervention were adhered to.  
 
The NCOP‟s delegation had interactive engagements with internal and external 
stakeholders of the Municipality. Internal stakeholders included the Mayor; Speaker; 
Chief-Whip; Administrator, and representatives of Organised Labour. External 
stakeholders included representatives from the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA); business; community forums, and non-governmental 
organisations NGOs). The main thrust of these discussions centred on procedures 
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  CoGTA SC Appropriations Briefing (2014) 26. 
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followed by the Provincial Government.174 Also, progress, if any, achieved by the 
Municipality was relayed to the NCOP delegation. The NCOP delegation was pleased 
with the progress made recommended in its Report to the NCOP to veto the 
intervention.175 On 10 September 2013, the NCOP had to consider the recommendation 
from the delegation. The NCOP went ahead, stating that it will disregard the above-
mentioned recommendation to veto the intervention. This response was based on two 
reasons; firstly, at the time the intervention period was close to expiring, thus not 
requiring the veto power to be exercised, and secondly, it was argued that the Report by 
the NCOP delegation was not appropriately tabled. No details were provided for this 
finding.  
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  Parliament Matlosana Report 4 of 8. 
175
  Parliament Matlosana Report 7 of 8. 
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4.3 Case study: Limpopo Provincial Government into the Mogalakwena Local 
Municipality disapproved by the Gauteng High Court in June 
2014 
 
4.3.1 Context triggering the intervention 
The Municipality was deemed politically unstable. The local government elections held 
in 2011 resulted in the ANC securing a majority of 52 seats, with the DA securing six; 
the COPE two, and the APC; AZAPO 1, and FF+ each one.176 The state of affairs in the 
Municipality was problematic because violent protests broke out, which ultimately led to 
the former Mayor, i.e. Tlhalefi Mashamaite being shot..177 Governance challenges in the 
Municipality related to two concerns. Irregular financial expenditure by the former Mayor 
created widespread unhappiness.178 For instance, a KPMG investigation uncovered that 
from 1 July to 30 October 2013, the Mayoral Discretionary fund was depleted from an 
initial balance of R1 784 311 to a mere R192 352,20.179 The money was used primarily 
for political events, not genuine mayoral outreach events.180 The former Mayor 
organised these events to promote his personal agenda, and ultimately his own 
popularity.181 Ironically, the previous audit findings for the Municipality had an excellent 
performance over the financial years 2009–2010, 2010–2011 and 2011–2012. In 
addition, a ratings agency rated the municipality as the best in Limpopo from 2007 to 
2011. 
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Secondly, political instability between the ANC factions led by the former Mayor on the 
one hand, and Mr William Mabuela on the other resulted in much contestation.182  When 
the Mabuela-faction gained power in the Municipality, it sought to take action as 
recommended in the KPMG investigation. As a result, the Municipality resolved to take 
disciplinary action against council members implicated in the irregular expenditure.183  
The Municipality wrote to the Provincial Government on 28 February 2014, requesting 
the MEC to remove the former Mayor and implicated councillors.184 On 10 March 2014, 
the MEC replied, advising the Municipality to apply the rules of natural justice and hear 
those in question in relation to the complaints against them.  
 
By letter dated 17 March 2014, the Municipality confirmed to the MEC that it would 
follow the MEC‟s instruction.185 Upon receipt of the Municipality‟s letter, the Provincial 
Government neglected to communicate to the Municipality its intention to intervene.186 
This decision was taken without providing any support efforts to the Municipality in 
terms of section 154 of the Constitution.187 It appeared that the intervention was 
underscored by political tensions within the different ANC factions.188 
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4.3.2 Action taken by the Provincial Government 
Keeping the above-mentioned in mind, tensions arose between the Provincial 
Government and the Municipality.189 On 17 March 2014, the provincial executive 
resolved to intervene in the Municipality. The grounds for the intervention included non-
fulfilment of executive obligations relating to (i) financial management; (ii) 
implementation and review of the IDP and Budget; (iii) development of policy and 
initiation of bylaws, and (v) coordination of the executive committee and municipal 
council. The Provincial Government appointed an Administrator to fulfil these duties.190 
However, the executive obligations were vague and there seemed to be no substantial 
basis for the intervention.191  
 
In response, the Municipality argued that the failure to issue a directive in the present 
circumstances made the intervention legally unsound. On this basis it requested the 
High Court to stay the intervention by providing an interdict against the actions of the 
provincial executive.192 The issue around the directive became the central question for 
determination in the court proceedings.193 The Court, citing Steytler and De Visser, 
confirmed that a failure to issue a directive deprives the Municipality in question of the 
opportunity to remedy the shortcomings in order to avoid an intervention.194   
                                                          
189
  Mogalakwena Case at para 15. 
190
  Mogalakwena Case at para 31. 
191
  Mogalakwena Case at para 33. 
192
  Mogalakwena Case at para 2.  
193
  Mogalakwena Case at paras 24 and 25. 
194
  Mogalakwena Case at paras 24 and 25. 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
Moreover, the Court found the action by the Provincial Government in violation of the 
prescripts for intergovernmental principles. This finding was specifically linked to the 
MEC writing to the municipal manager to divest him of all his powers.195 This action was 
rather punitive and against the cooperative governance principles.196 Moreover, the 
Court found no justification for the intervention.197 Based on this argument, the Court 
viewed the intervention as inappropriate, and rather as a tool to settle political scores.198  
The province sent notification of the intervention to both the Minister and NCOP before 
the court case. Yet both stakeholders failed to act immediately upon receipt of the 
section 139(1)(b) notice.199 In addition, the Minster and the NCOP were cited as third 
and fourth respondents in the urgent application brought by the Municipality on 27 May 
2014 to the Gauteng High Court to prevent the Provincial Government from intruding 
into its affairs. However, no response or representation was forthcoming from either the 
Minister and/ or the NCOP.  
 
4.3.3 Response from the Minister  
Based on the literature reviewed for the purposes of this study, it could be argued that 
no engagements with relevant stakeholders occurred. However, a meeting was 
requested by the former Minister, i.e.  Minister Baloyi on 09 April 2014.200 The purpose 
                                                          
195
  Mogalakwena Case at para 42. 
196
  Mogalakwena Case at para 26. 
197
  Mogalakwena Case at para 26. 
198
  Mogalakwena Case at para 46. 
199
  Mogalakwena Case at paras 24 and 25. 
200
  Ministry Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Republic of South Africa Letter to the MEC Human 
Settlements and Traditional Affairs Limpopo Provincial Government dated 09 April 2014 (Reference 3/6/6/5/5) 
(2014).  
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
of the meeting was to discuss the following issues with the Provincial Government, 
namely: 
(i) What section 154 support initiatives were provided;  
(ii) The reasons for the decision to divest the municipal manager of his authority;  
(iii) What specific executive obligations were not met, and; 
 (iv) The grounds on which the municipal manager could be held accountable for 
executive failures.201  
What is not clear from the available information is whether the meeting did in fact occur. 
The correspondence available only related to the requesting for the meeting and the 
points for discussion articulated above.  
 
It would appear from the above-mentioned letter that a clear mandate was established, 
yet no reconnaissance is documented. On 4 September 2014, a proposal was made to 
the Provincial Government to establish an Inter-Departmental Task Team comprising 
officials from CoGTA; National Treasury; the South African Police Service (SAPS); 
Limpopo Premier‟s Office, and the Limpopo provincial CoGTA.202 The Task Team was 
expected to deal with all pertinent issues in an attempt to stabilise the Municipality.203 A 
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TOR was to be developed to guide this process. However, there is no information 
available that details and/ or confirms the outcomes of this process. For instance, no 
recovery plan is available and as at 16 September 2014, the Minister failed to veto the 
intervention. 
4.3.4 Response from the NCOP 
There is no information available to suggest that the NCOP consulted the Government 
and/ or the Municipality, particularly since it was cited in the application to court.  
However, on 16 September 2014, the NCOP requested the Minister to brief it on the 
support that will be provided to the Municipality.204 In similar vein to the Minister, the 
NCOP did not veto the intervention.  
 
On 4 November 2014, Ms Kholer-Barnard, a DA Member of Parliament (MP), issued a 
statement in Parliament reporting that on 3 November 2014 police actions at the 
Mogalakwena Municipality amounted to a „coup d’etat’.205 She noted that the SAPS not 
only seized physical control of the municipal building, without the necessary legal 
processes being followed, but also exerted violent action against „security offices, staff 
and municipal councillors‟ in that police members reportedly attacked and pointed 
firearms at them.206 Moreover, SAPS „allegedly arrested the municipal manager, and 
forced the Council to swear in nine new Proportional Representative councillors‟.207 
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In response, the High Court pointed out that the intervention was not appropriate and was 
not in keeping with the constitutional principles.208. It also alluded to the veto power being 
ineffective in practise.209 In an emphatic display of total disregard for the Court‟s finding, 
the Minister and NCOP are yet to exercise the veto power to terminate the 
intervention.210  
 
4.4     Poor regulatory framework 
Chapter 2 emphasised the legal and policy frameworks for interventions.211 Amongst its 
shortcomings, as cited by key stakeholders is inconsistency in interpretation and 
application of the law; irregular procedural processes followed, and unclear outcomes 
achieved.212 Now, since the veto power is inextricably linked to interventions, a rational 
conclusion could be drawn that shortcomings in the legal framework will impact the veto 
power. Accordingly, observations in this section is constructed around the legal 
uncertainty and contested terrain of the veto power; and undue weighting of the Minister 
and NCOP to condone interventions that meet substantive thresholds but fail to comply 
with legal and procedural requirements. 
The Minister and NCOP have failed to veto several interventions that are undertaken by 
means of inappropriate and/ or irregular processes.213 Important to bear in mind though, 
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is that the Minister and NCOP have to operate in a milieu of legal uncertainly.214 
Throughout their interactions, fairness to both local and provincial governments must be 
maintained.215 In doing so, they must continue to, at all times, operate within their 
constitutionally allocated powers.216 This can be difficult at times.217 On the one hand, 
CoGTA is challenged by provinces not to encroach on provincial powers of municipal 
monitoring and oversight.218 On the other hand, the Department of Public Services and 
Administration (DPSA) has recently challenged CoGTA on oversight of provinces 
claiming it falls within the DPSA‟s mandate.219The latter became contentious and 
amounted to a „turf battle‟ between the two departments.220 In addition, DPSA 
developed a separate Bill to CoGTA‟s Intergovernmental, Monitoring, Support, and 
Interventions Bill.221 This demonstrates high levels of legal complexity and the extent of 
the disputed terrain in which the Minister and its department operates.222 It must be 
added that this muddied terrain is not new with respect to interventions.223    
Compounding an already strained regulatory environment, as was discussed in chapter 
2, no prescribed processes are available to execute the veto power.224 Further to this, 
no sanctions are prescribed for non-compliance with reporting requirements.225 This 
seriously compromises the Minister and NCOP and could possibly place them at a 
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disadvantage in addressing multiple issues to be considered when they contemplate to 
exercise their veto power.226 Although, an argument could be made that failure to 
comply with the reporting requirements, is of little consequence.227 This could be true if 
one is cognisant of the fact that interventions are „malleable in nature‟ and change 
rapidly over short periods.228 However, this reasoning is flawed. The focus here is not 
so much about the value-add of receiving those reports and it relevance as opposed to 
how the Minister and NCOP must respond to specific interventions.229 The significance 
here is to inculcate a culture of IGR that underscores provinces‟ commitment to the co-
operative governance arrangements.230 Simply put, this process should not be viewed 
as a discretional obligation.231 The submission of reports indicates willingness by 
provinces to keep the Minister and NCOP abreast of developments within its jurisdiction 
and fosters greater transparency.232 The Minister and NCOP can thus interrogate fully 
underlying root causes for each scenario at a municipality.233  
Despite the above-mentioned challenges, reviews undertaken on the NCOP strongly 
confirm the institutional astuteness in executing its operations.234 In contrast, no 
independent study was conducted on the performance of the Minister and his 
department, i.e. CoGTA. However, the available information shows sound legal 
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understanding and appreciation of its constitutional duty towards interventions.235 The 
latter is also demonstrated in the IMSI Bill.236 The bottom line is that the methodology 
used by the Minister and NCOP meets legal scrutiny.237 While the methodology was 
discussed in chapter 2 and its application presented in chapter 3, the question in this 
chapter is why interventions are not terminated for failing to meet procedural 
requirements? The answer seems to lie in the fact that in most cases the actual 
circumstances of the municipality warrants intervention.238 Alternatively put, where the 
substantive grounds are met for an intervention, the Minister and NCOP are 
apprehensive to veto.239 This is not a new phenomenon, especially if one keeps in mind 
that the NCOP has previously displayed lenience towards provinces failing to follow the 
correct legal process due to a lack of understanding of the legal framework.240  
 
Also, provinces continue to bemoan the procedural conundrum for interventions.241 For 
instance, the Minister and NCOP are slow to veto procedurally incorrect interventions 
because according to CoGTA, one third of the country‟s 283 municipalities are in a state 
of distress and require serious interventions.242 The NCOP also found in certain 
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instances municipal functionality is so poor it actually requires intervention.243 Yet this 
does not excuse or condone failure of the Minister and NCOP to utilise the veto 
power.244 It is not for the Minister and NCOP to circumscribe powers conferred to it 
through the Constitution, albeit not expressly defined powers.245 Rather, it is for the 
Minister and NCOP to progressively realise their powers and functions diligently as well 
as constitutionally.246 The purpose of the veto power is not to correct interventions, but 
to serve as a safeguard against improper interventions.247 Therefore, the veto power 
should serve to protect the institutional integrity of municipalities.248 Against this 
background, it is important to consider that the extension of the veto power was 
advocated for during the Second Amendment drafting process to strengthen the powers 
of the Minister and NCOP to terminate improper interventions for all types of 
interventions.249 The rationale for this was to make interventions an exception rather 
than the norm.250 In contrast, the veto power has become the exception.251  
The poor utilisation of the veto power also undervalues the central IGR role expected of 
the Minister and the NCOP.252 Particularly so since SALGA253; CoGTA254 and NCOP255 
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confirm that intervention outcomes are often not curative in nature and seldom have 
sustainable outcomes.256 Conspicuously, interventions are inconsistently applied and 
highly politicised.257 Crucial to note is that where interventions were terminated, positive 
outcomes were achieved through identification of integrated support efforts by different 
stakeholders across all spheres of government.258 If the veto power had perhaps been 
used frequently it may have benefited much more municipalities placed under improper 
interventions 
4.5       Political contestation 
Interventions are known to involve „settling of political scores‟, even when valid grounds 
are used, and for this reason, intervention is often underpinned by political 
contestation.259 Likewise, the veto power is also embedded in a „culture of impunity‟ 
where „political allegiance‟ determines responses from provincial and national 
governments.260 Therefore, the political and administrative interface becomes difficult to 
distinguish.261 The Multi-Level Government Initiative Audit Barometer findings 
demonstrate and confirm cases of inconsistency by the national government in 
determining when to intervene262. For instance, „when some municipalities obtain a 
disclaimer they immediately intervene yet other municipalities with repeated disclaimers 
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are not intervened’.263 No rational explanation makes sense for this disparate 
treatment264 According to Lund T:  
This fuels perceptions inside and outside the ANC about interventions not being as much about 
saving the municipality and its surrounding economy from financial ruin as they are about purging 
a politician who is not in a particular faction‟.
265
 
The Mogalakwene case study is testimony to the haphazard approach by the Minister 
and the NCOP. Here, punitive action was exerted on a municipality for 
maladministration and corruption caused by the former leadership of the municipality, 
which at the time of the intervention was in the process of being ousted.266 One would 
assume that proper IGR require the Minister, for the very least, to give the newly 
established leadership time to effect changes deemed necessary by them.267 Even 
more appropriately, the Minister should have opted for a cooperative approach to IGR to 
be followed by establishing a support plan in terms of section 154 of the Constitution.268 
Rather, the Minister was insistent on seeing the intervention through.269  
The above-mentioned insistence gives rise to the question  why the Minister supported 
the intervention?270 More conspicuous is the ANC‟s failure to take action against 
Mashamaite despite recommendations for criminal charges to be laid against him‟ from 
the KPMG Report.271  
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In fact, there were „reports of an apparent plot by the ANC heavyweights in the province 
to reinstate Mashamaite as mayor.272 According to Mogalakwena, Mayor William 
Mabuela, who is one of the 22 councillors being expelled, „The ANC teaches us that our 
number one enemy is corruption yet here we are being victimised for taking a strong 
stand on corruption while the corrupt are being protected.273 On this point it is useful to 
note [r]eluctance on the part of the ANC to deal with corruption in its ranks is indeed one 
of the factors helping to undermine the legitimacy of local government.274 Also, there 
may be an element of politicking surfacing since dominant councillors within the ANC 
are often not dealt with.275 The underlying reason for this approach appears to be the 
ability of these councillors to draw votes during elections, and more significantly, 
influence the appointment of members to provincial and national party structures.276. 
 
The High Court‟s views on this intervention are useful.277 The Court demonstrated 
apprehension towards the veto power as a mechanism to really protect the Municipality 
from political stratagems exerted by the Provincial Government.278 It diverted dealing 
with the relevance of the veto power by arguing that the limited timeframes available to 
the Minister and NCOP made it impracticable for the veto power to be applied given the 
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pending litigation.279 Upon further scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the Court failed to 
identify what exactly the veto power was supposed to do, and how it should serve to 
protect the Municipality.280 Thus, the Court did not refer to the Minister‟s IGR role that is 
expected from the veto power.281 By implication, to strengthen the veto power it must be 
viewed as free from political meddling. 
 
Directing the discussion now to the NCOP, positive strides made by the NCOP in 
dealing with interventions must be acknowledged.282 Despite external political 
influences continuing to threaten its very existence and/ or diminishing its powers, the 
NCOP was efficient in executing its mandate. Yet, one cannot assume that the NCOP is 
near to achieving its full potential.283 Also, the NCOP has not been decisive in its 
utilisation of the veto power, as discussed earlier in particularly the Molatsane case.284 
Despite the recommendation by the select committee not to support the intervention, 
the NCOP refused to endorse the recommendation. Another case in point is the 
disparate response to the Madibeng and Swellendam interventions. In the former case, 
the NCPO quickly conducted an independent evaluation of the municipal state of affairs, 
but failed to follow suit with respect to Swellendam. What seems most problematic is the 
serious threat to municipal autonomy in Mogalakwene, which has not received a rapid 
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response from the Minister, and the NCOP has failed to hold both the Provincial 
Government and the Minister accountable. No curative measures have been 
implemented to address serious challenges confronting the Municipality. 
Mugoyo suggests that the NCOP‟s inconsistency could be attributed to what could be 
phrase  partisan politics. In 2010, Mugoyo, conducted a study on the impact of the 
NCOP, and found it to be subjected to deeply rooted practices of partisan politics:285  
[T]he political dominance of the ANC ensures that most important decisions are made through 
party structures and inter-sphere executive structures, thus undermining or bypassing the 
NCOP… . This current political environment is further reinforced by strict party discipline which 
ensures that party members in the NCOP adhere to party policies as opposed to any independent 
views which may be contrary to party positions on issues‟.
286
 
Observations made about the NCOP certainly points to centrality of political factors in 
shaping its decisions and actions.287 Whether challenges confronting the veto power 
within the NCOP can be overcome remains difficult to answer. In addition, Murray and 
Simeon argue that the NCOP is not only strained by political influences, but rather and 
more significantly is confronted with systemic problems related to its functioning.288 
They attribute these problems to the ruling party‟s antagonism for federalist‟s principles, 
which the NCOP must fulfil keeping in mind the country‟s multi-level government 
design.289These authors posit certain thoughts as to what is required to overcome the 
systemic problems of the NCOP. This is significant in that it will ultimately add to the 
recommendations in the concluding chapter. Murray and Simeon argue that once a new 
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political culture is embedded in the multi-level governance system, „the effectiveness of 
the design of the NCOP will most likely come into its own right when competitive politics 
replaces the political space that is currently characterised by ‘one party dominance’.290 
Arguably, the NCOP‟s inconsistency in the veto power remains to be linked to its 
adherence to „one party dominance‟.  
 
4.6        Lack of accountability 
The veto power was designed within the context of the intergovernmental role that both 
the Minister and NCOP are required to fulfil.291 To ensure from an executive and 
legislative arm, citizens‟ best interest particularly regarding service delivery is protected 
at all times.292 Based on this assumption, an accountability chain is established, 
coherently linking all spheres to its citizens.293 Where one sphere fails, the other should 
ideally step in to ensure corrective action and throughout this process institutional 
autonomy and integrity of each sphere should be maintained.294 However, in practise 
multi-level governance is not working too well.295 Despite federal principles contained in 
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the Constitution, key players (i.e. the Minister and the NCOP) are not capacitated within 
this system to adequately give effect to their roles.296  
 
The veto power is modelled around federal concepts of institutional autonomy for multi-
level governments where constituency play a central role.297 Consequently, 
accountability to citizens demands that the Minister and NCOP not only terminate 
improper interventions, but also establish sustainable mechanisms for integrated 
support from all of government to address these shortcomings. Arguably the veto power 
is failing in this regard. Moreover, citizens are disgruntled about poor service delivery, 
which has led to „social tensions‟ and a steady increase in violent protests.298  
 
The Minister and NCOP are failing to practice their required oversight in holding 
government to account for improper interventions. Developmental local government 
requires that all spheres significantly contribute to attainting the ideal state presented in 
the WPLG.299 Admittedly, the reality for local government is far from the developmental 
state.300 Attributing factors include misguided policies; conflicting policy priorities; high 
levels of corruption and mismanagement; lack of capacity, and competency as well as 
increasingly violent protests.301 Blaming this state of affairs on local government alone is 
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inappropriate.302 For the most part, factors mentioned above equally apply to other 
spheres.303 Chief failures relate to support rendered, or not, by national and provincial 
governments, which is uncoordinated; inconsistent; fragmented, and predominantly 
lacking.304  
 
Drawing on analysis from interventions, it becomes clear that the local government 
configuration is set to fail.305 Apart from associated factors of poor legal regulatory 
framework and political dynamics, the veto power is not adequately protecting the 
autonomy and integrity of local government.306 Importantly, the direct role local 
government plays with its local residents impacts on perceptions of government as a 
whole.307 Considering this proposition, it‟s imperative for the Minister and NCOP to 
vigilantly expose shortcomings of all stakeholders in interventions and accordingly hold 
them to account.308  
Bearing in mind that interventions are the most „drastic step‟ in efforts to maintain 
service delivery standards, one would assume that dialogue with citizens must be 
prioritised.309 While consultations do sporadically transpire with relevant stakeholders, 
and most importantly local communities, it is could be argued that current efforts by the 
Minister appear to fall short of the required standards.310 The South African Constitution 
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stipulates in section 195 (1e), “the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-
making” and the general principle is that this is facilitated through public hearings.  
Previously, structured engagement through the „imbizo system‟ established dialogue 
with citizens. Ministers and senior officials from respective departments would visit a 
municipality for a week and „reconnect with local communities and collect data‟.311 
Given the lack of consistent monitoring information available, this will also stand the 
Minister in good stead as to know what is happening at a regional, and most 
importantly, local level.312  
 
In contrast, the NCOP is emerging as an entity that holds provincial governments to 
account and do question national government on support provided to municipalities.313 
In addition, the NCOP displays ardent aspiration when conducting oversight visits and 
consulting stakeholders and citizens.314 However, the approach by the NCOP has been 
critiqued and found to be usurping the role of provincial legislatures.315 Mugoya opines 
that „it amounts to management of the interventions in the same manner as the PL‟316 
This argument as advanced by Mugoya is technically sound, but given the insipid role 
provincial legislatures have played, one can possibly understand how this practise came 
into realisation. Nevertheless, what is required of the NCOP is to establish 
accountability from provincial legislatures to its constituency by making them exercise 
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appropriate oversight over provincial executives on the one hand, and facilitating and 
encouraging engagement with constituents on the other.    
 
In addition, when the Minister and NCOP fail to call out politically motivated 
interventions, it entrenches a paradigm where accountability by the municipal council 
and/ or provincial executive lies with party regional and national structures instead of the 
local residents.317 This failure completely violates the accountability as conceptualised 
in the Constitution and the WPLG.   
 
A different matter requiring attention is the general lack of integration between IGR; 
monitoring; support, and interventions, which is troublesome since this linkage forms 
part of the accountability chain between the different spheres of government.318 Prior to 
interventions, CoGTA may not have been aware of the state of affairs at a municipality 
or alternatively failed to take decisive action against defaulting municipalities, which 
then results in an intervention.319 In contrast, NT as the institution performing oversight 
over financial governance, appears to be aware of municipalities‟ non-compliance with 
legislated prescripts.320 Where there is non-compliance, the NT will issue a notice of 
punitive action to be taken should the misdemeanour persist.321 As a result, remedial 
efforts are instituted to avoid such threats.322 Yet, this does not seem to be the case for 
interventions related to non-financial governance and/ or service delivery issues, mainly 
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because the state of affairs may have deteriorated so badly, rendering it virtually 
impossible to turnover in short periods.323. The methodology followed by the Minister 
fails to ensure consistent oversight and accountability on interventions, and to date, no 
IGR structure is in place for this specific purpose.324  
 
Accordingly, the veto power fails to create an on-going mechanism that builds 
institutional knowledge on what works in practise and how best to limit unnecessary 
interventions in future.325 The constitutional design envisages a reality where 
interventions are only brought as a matter of last resort. As a result, the veto power 
must be a consistent barometer to detect shortcomings in interventions and introduce 
measures to overcome identified shortcomings.  
 
The barometer mentioned above requires real time monitoring of provinces and 
municipalities.326 This would empower the Minister to act quickly to veto undue 
interventions and will prevent legal costs being accrued due to court action.327 The point 
to be made here is that while the veto power is only triggered by an intervention, the 
mechanism to fully capacitate the Minister in exercising the veto power requires 
constant and thorough monitoring of municipalities.328  
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However, monitoring of municipalities as a constitutional function falls within the ambit 
of provincial governments and the Minister should check to ensure that his department 
empowers provinces to do this by establishing sound monitoring tools.329 To date no 
standard format for reporting has been prescribed.330 When information is submitted by 
provinces to CoGTA, there is seldom a response.331 CoGTA should interrogate 
provinces‟ information on municipalities and identify bespoke approaches (e.g. 
integrated support plans) for the purposes of municipalities displaying signs of requiring 
intervention. If these shortcomings are addressed, then the veto power will be adhering 
to the Constitutional standard with respect to accountability promised to citizens.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter built on the discussions in chapters 2 and 3, and confirmed, 
based on an empirical study, why the veto power is failing in practise. Multiple reasons 
were proffered for these failings. The central argument was that inconsistent application 
of the veto power by the Minister and NCOP is related to the poor regulatory framework; 
political contestation, and lack of accountability.  
 
The discussion highlighted many shortcomings concerning the implementation of the 
veto power.  Bearing these shortcomings in mind, the veto power ought to foster greater 
support to municipalities by ensuring its autonomy is vigorously protected and that 
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appropriate support was provided prior to an intervention. These protective measures 
could possibly address existing lack of municipal integrated support. A serious 
indictment on local government is the unfair distribution of responsibilities and/ or blame 
for service delivery failures. Even more alarming is the impunity towards inappropriate 
and piecemeal assistance by provincial and national government, undue financial 
expenses incurred from interventions, and lack of sustainable outcomes of 
interventions.332   
 
Municipalities continue to perform their functions without clearly defined benchmarks, 
especially considering its broad constitutional mandate. A noticeable failure by the 
Minister and NCOP in this regard is to strengthen monitoring and supervision of local 
government and to create greater clarity for both local and provincial government as to 
what is expected from each of them, and what role national government must play.333 
Furthermore, provincial and national government ought „to ensure that local government 
is not only stable, but also has capacity to deliver on its goals‟334 Thus far, interventions 
had predominantly negative implications for municipalities. The Select Committee on 
G&TA confirmed that in most cases interventions occur when municipalities are in a 
complete state of breakdown.335 This means that both provincial and national 
government reneged on its responsibility towards service delivery. This failure is 
aggravated through the Minister and the NCOP‟s leniency in using the veto power and 
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more specifically not holding provincial and national government accountable within the 
framework of the veto power.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
5.1      Introduction 
 
 
The study set out to establish through evidence-based research whether the veto power 
continues to be relevant, and alternatively, whether the veto power is working in 
practise? In reaching an answer to this question the legal and policy framework 
regulating interventions were examined in chapter 2; the data on interventions from 
2010 to 2014 were documented in chapter 3, and chapter 4 evaluated the shortcomings 
related to the veto power.  
 
From the research it became clear that interventions are a contentious issue in 
practice.336 It requires careful and articulated responses from all stakeholders 
involved.337 Greater insight into interventions points out the importance of the veto 
power with respect to co-operative governance.338 However, failure to conceptualise the 
veto power as a significant tool for this purpose has resulted in its failure in practise.  
 
This chapter will provide an evaluative summary of the research findings. 
Recommendations and best practise will be presented to improve implementation of the 
veto power. Moreover, it will be argued that the current reality for intervention requires 
the veto power to be strengthened as it remains relevant as an IGR and oversight tool. 
A thorough evaluation of the astuteness of the institutions to achieve this goal goes 
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beyond the scope of this study, but it will be argued that from a theoretical perspective 
the information and institutional knowledge of the institutions is already at a 
sophisticated level, with the only gap existing being proper  implementation.     
 
 
 
5.2 Overview on findings for the veto power in practise 
 
 
 Constitutional protection against undue interventions is failing in practice since 
intergovernmental checks to safeguard municipal autonomy remains far and in 
between.339 This is so despite institutions articulating concern that interventions 
are highly politicised and at times it is unclear why certain municipalities are 
subjected to intervention compared to others that are equally delinquent in its 
performance.340   
 
 The veto power is modelled around federal concepts of institutional autonomy for 
multi-level governments where constituency play a central role. Consequently, 
accountability to citizens demands that the Minister and NCOP not only terminate 
improper interventions, but also establish sustainable mechanisms for integrated 
support from all of government to address these shortcomings. However, the 
veto power is failing in this regard. Moreover, citizens are disgruntled about poor 
service delivery which has led to „social tensions‟ and steady increase in „violent 
protests‟ 
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 Legal uncertainty for intervention remains problematic and creates uneven 
application of rules and policy requirements.341 The evaluations provided by 
SALGA, provinces, CoGTA and the NCOP are consistent and provide a coherent 
story as to why interventions are problematic.342 Yet what does not transpire from 
the evaluations is a sense of acknowledgment from national and provincial 
government that failures in the local government environment must not be borne 
by municipalities alone.343 The reality is that there exists a lack of accountability 
by national and provincial government.344  This lack of accountability is 
aggravated since the MLGI Barometer on audit findings expressed concern that 
„national and provincial support to municipalities is difficult to track‟. 345 
 
 Problematic monitoring, support and intervention practices continue to occur.346 
To date no uniform reporting template is available that contain integrated 
information at a municipal level.347 This situation is aggravated by inadequate 
capacity and resources available to effectively monitor municipal performance.348 
This could ultimately be blamed partially for the inconsistent application of the 
veto power.  
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 The Minister and CoGTA have no structured IGR platform with a specific focus 
on oversight and accountability for municipalities placed under administration.349 
Alternatively, existing structures are not maximised for this purpose where 
agenda items are tabled and resolutions documented and follow-up action 
monitored.350 Regulating interventions in this structured manner will achieve 
credibility for the veto power.    
 
 A different model is yet to be implemented with appropriate benchmarks to 
measure municipal performance.351 This will enable the veto power to be 
implemented in terms of established standards, but taking into account that 
varying capacity levels of municipalities.352 Obviously, using the veto power in 
this context will justify inconsistency based on those differentiated standards.353  
 
 Sound policy on integrated approaches for services delivery is available such as 
the single window of coordination, and the recent call by the President to go Back 
to Basics. But churning out more and more policy documents is simply not 
enough.354 What is required is actual implementation of basic principles 
espoused in the Constitution and the White Paper on Local Government.355 
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 Interventions that were terminated illustrated how intervention outcomes could be 
achieved through different methods.356 This makes it difficult to reconcile why the 
veto power is seldom invoked. 
 
 Lack of political will to strengthen the veto power could possibly be associated 
with the poor state of affairs for approximately one third of the municipalities in 
the country.357 There appears to be a relaxing of the veto power due to what is 
perceived to be necessary interventions even in instances where provinces 
institute processes that display flagrant disregard for democratic processes.358     
 
 Interventions are known to involve „settling of political scores‟, even when valid 
grounds used for intervention are underpinned by political contestation.  
Likewise, the veto power is also embedded in a „culture of impunity‟ where 
„political allegiance‟ determines responses from provincial and national 
governments.  Therefore, the political and administrative interface requires 
constant monitoring for signs of political meddling.359 
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5.3 Recommendations 
As stated already, the veto power remains relevant, especially given the context of 
interventions.360 This section will draw on methods to improve the veto power in 
practise.   
 
 Fast-tracking adoption of the IMSI Bill is essential for the creation of normative 
standards and in turn uniformity will be established for both the implementation 
and regulation of interventions.361 The Bill should be accompanied by regulations 
to add practical guidance to the legal provisions.362 If the DPSA proceeds to 
separate national interventions into provinces from the IMSI Bill it needs to 
ensure that equal standards are benchmarked to ensure fairness and 
consistency in oversight of the different spheres.363  However, it is submitted that 
to strengthen the veto power all interventions should be championed by one 
political and administrative champion.364  
 
 To strengthen the veto power, the Minister and NCOP must be proactive in 
terminating intervention.365 In order to achieve this, the Minister should require 
integrated municipal specific reporting across all spheres of government.366 This 
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will empower the Minister to immediately direct where support is required when 
supporting the municipality in trouble.367     
 
 CoGTA lacks a dedicated structure to deal with interventions. This structure 
should ideally be resourced by a multi-functional team comprising technical 
experts on IGR, support, monitoring, and interventions. Moreover, this structure 
should keep the Minister abreast on a weekly basis on problems at provinces 
and municipalities and identify appropriate action to be taken (i.e. consulting, 
monitoring and/ or provision of integrated support). This process of engagement 
will accommodate rapid responses from the Minister.368  
 
 The veto power must be documented and reported on in the same way approved 
interventions are documented. In this way the veto power will gain more 
prominence. Furthermore, the Minister should strengthen the application of the 
veto power by revitalising the Imbizo system of engagement with local 
communities. The latter will strengthen accountability towards citizens and 
outwardly demonstrate the accountability chain of the cooperative governance 
system that coherently links all spheres to its citizens.369 Where one sphere fails 
the other steps in to ensure corrective action and throughout this process 
institutional autonomy and integrity of each sphere is maintained, while citizens‟ 
best interests are prioritised.  
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Over and above the proposed internal structure within CoGTA to ensure rapid 
responses when dealing with interventions and the veto power, and apart from 
the above-mentioned Imbizo system of engagement with local communities, it is 
recommended that the Minister contemplates a similar process as the WCPG‟s 
Municipal Review and Outlook (MGRO) as initiated in 2012.370 Drawing from 
international best practices, this initiative is based on the Canadian Oversight 
Model and provides for structured engagement with municipalities on its 
governance and audit findings.371 Further to this, it identifies integrated support 
action by province to adequately address both financial and non-financial 
challenges confronting municipalities.372 The support does not only relate to 
resource capacity or expertise but also to financial support.373 Since limited 
financial resources are available, a competitive process is followed through which 
municipalities are required to strongly motivate if they want to apply for additional 
funds.374 This incentivises municipalities to improve their performances.375 Within 
the context of the veto power, this initiative is forward looking and creates 
accountability from political and administrative heads. Moreover, support efforts 
are identifiable and a cooperative working relationship is forged. For these 
reasons, the Western Cape‟s MEC for Local Government attributes the 
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Provinces‟ performance in receiving the best audit outcomes for 2012/13 to the 
above-mentioned initiative.376 Keeping all of this in mind, it should be ideal if the 
Minister of CoGTA also considers this, or similar initiative for all the provinces. 
Alternatively, the Minister can use the Canadian Model at a national level and 
facilitate engagements with provinces and municipalities by means of the Imbizo 
system.   
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